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Abstract: Despite recent scholarly attention, the phenomenon of resistance in post-conflict 
environments remains largely under-conceptualized. This represents a major shortcoming 
in the theory and praxis of post-conflict peacebuilding and development. Seeking to 
address this problem, this study explores how, why and by whom the economic dimensions 
of contemporary peacebuilding and development projects are contested in their local 
applications, using South Sudan as a case study. A theoretical framework for analyzing 
resistance is proposed and subsequently employed to provide insights into activities that 
are cast as informal, illicit or illegitimate by dominant neoliberal orthodoxy. This is done in 
three distinct yet overlapping ways. First, the role that informal economic activity plays in 
the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan is examined. Informal economic 
activity is conceptualized as a form of resistance to the failings of the formal sphere, but 
also as a form of power where agency is absent and that is encouraged as a type of local 
neoliberalism. Second, the legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies that define 
economic activity in post-conflict South Sudan are problematized through an exploration 
of current debates surrounding corruption and land tenure. These debates demonstrate how 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy breaks down and becomes redefined in its local contacts. 
Finally, the centre/periphery dynamics that define the political economy of South Sudan’s 
borderlands are conceptualized in terms of power and resistance, and resistance is shown to 
be fundamentally tied to power in ways that are characterized by subjectivity and 
hybridity. Resistance plays an important role in post-conflict environments. Addressing its 
economic dimensions must be a central task of contemporary peacebuilding and 
development projects. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
i. Research Problem  
Since the end of the Cold War, internationally led peacebuilding operations have 
come to prominence as a largely unquestioned, unproblematized tool for intervening in 
post-conflict spaces. Championed by a variety of states, intergovernmental organizations 
and civil society groups, these have broadly been characterized by a common set of values, 
assumptions, processes, discourses, methods, systems of knowledge and modes of 
organization.
1
 The promotion of neoliberal political, social and economic reforms, 
including democratization, marketization, the rule of law and human rights, is seen as 
central to the establishment of peace, development and security in societies that have 
recently emerged from conflict.
2
 Despite the apparent strength of this consensus, however, 
contemporary peace operations have frequently failed to achieve even their most modest 
objective—the establishment of a viable long-term peace—and have experienced a similar 
lack of success in the related goal of building liberal states and societies. In post-conflict 
contexts ranging from El Salvador to Kosovo and Sierra Leone to Timor Leste, the ‘liberal 
peace’ paradigm has been unable to meet the expectations of both practitioners and 
recipients, bringing into question its utility and appropriateness for addressing the 
complexities of post-conflict environments.
3
  
At the same time, a selection scholars and policymakers have developed an 
increasingly coherent and thorough critique of the assumptions, approaches and conceptual 
                                                          
1
 Barnett, Michael et al., “Peacebuilding: What Is In a Name?” Global Governance 13 (1) 2007: 35-58. 
2
 The United Nations is a primary actor in international peace operations and has been central to the 
conceptual and practical development of peacebuilding. Particularly important documents include: United 
Nations General Assembly and Security Council, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; Report of the Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Development,” 
A/48/935, 6 May 1994; Report of the Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” 31 January 1992; Report of the Secretary-General, “In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” 21 March 2005, A/59/2005; Report of the 
Secretary-General, “Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict,” A/67/499, 8 October 2012; Report of the 
Secretary-General, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath 
of Conflict,” A/64/866*-S/2010/386*, 16 July 2010; Report of the Secretary-General, “Report of the 
Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,” A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 
2009; Report of the Secretary-General, “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,” 3 January 1995; and Report 
of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility,” 2004. 
3
 A brief introduction to these and other case studies can be found in: Paris, Roland, At War’s End: Building 
Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; and Richmond, Oliver and Jason 
Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2009. 
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and practical failings that define these processes and hinder their success. Within this body 
of literature, it is perhaps possible to define three separate—if overlapping and internally 
diverse—schools of thought.4 Liberal criticisms of contemporary peace operations embrace 
the ultimate objective of establishing liberal democratic states and societies, but disagree 
on the best methods for realizing this goal. In doing so, they commonly focus on best 
practice and lessons learned from past experience, responding to policy failures by altering 
the order, scope or depth of reforms rather than meaningfully scrutinizing the presumed 
benefits of liberalization.
5
 Realist critiques, conversely, stress the importance of strategic 
considerations, assigning primacy to the interests of intervening actors as a means of 
avoiding the perceived shortcomings of poorly conceived peace operations.
6
 Critical 
approaches, finally, emphasize the myriad power relations that define peace operations and 
seek to problematize their underlying assumptions. In doing so, they attempt to move 
beyond the problem-solving methods that are seen to characterize dominant theory and 
praxis, exploring the tensions, inconsistencies and hierarchies that underlie neoliberal 
forms of global governance while seeking to define emancipatory alternatives.
7
 Although 
important disagreements differentiate these approaches, they nevertheless highlight several 
important shortcomings that define contemporary peacebuilding: that it neglects the root 
causes of conflict, many of which are actually exacerbated by liberal reforms; that it is tied 
                                                          
4
 Like most categorizations of scholarly and policy literature, the divisions outlined here are neither all-
encompassing nor universally accepted. Other approaches to this body of work can be found in: Mac Ginty, 
Roger, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid forms of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, 41-46; Chandler, David, “The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’,” Review of 
International Studies 36 (1) 2011: 137-155; and Mitchell, Audra, “Peace beyond Process,” Millennium—
Journal of International Studies 38 (3) 2010: 641-664. 
5
 This logic primarily defines the self-reflection of major peacebuilding actors, and can be observed in a 
variety of reports and documents. For scholarly examples of this approach, see: Doyle, Michael and Nicholas 
Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006; Paris, Roland, “Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary 
Studies of the Liberal Peace,” International Studies Review 8 (3) 2006: 425-440; Paris, Roland, 
“Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security, 22 (2) 1997: 54-89; Paris, 
Roland, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36 (2) 2010: 337-365; Paris, Roland 
and Timothy Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009; and Paris (2004). 
6
 Walton, C. Dale, “The Case for Strategic Traditionalism: War, National Interest and Liberal 
Peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping 16 (5) 2009: 717-734. 
7
 Fetherston, A.B., “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical 
Frameworks,” International Peacekeeping 7 (1) 2000: 190-218; and Schmid Herman, “Peace Research and 
Politics,” Journal of Peace Research 5 (3) 1968: 217-232. The distinction between traditional problem-
solving methods and critical approaches in the International Relations discipline is originally presented in 
Cox, Robert W., “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 
Millennium—Journal of International Studies 10 (2) 1981: 126-155. 
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to an understanding of liberal modernity that seeks to reinforce an unjust, unrepresentative 
and inherently unstable status quo in the international system; that it ignores the contextual 
specificities that define individual post-conflict environments, dehistoricizing and 
depoliticizing actors, events and processes in favour of universalized, teleological and 
inflexible understandings of progress; and that it silences alternative ontologies, 
epistemologies, understandings of peace and justice and forms of political, social and 
economic organization in favour of an unrepresentative, securitized and elite-centred 
orthodoxy.
8
 
Despite the value that this diverse body of work has for theorizing peacebuilding 
and developing a thorough critique of its various failings, resistance to the discourses, 
processes and individual applications of peace operations remains theoretically under-
conceptualized and empirically under-studied. A number of recent studies have focused on 
local perspectives on externally driven peacebuilding missions, making valuable 
contributions to the broader project of understanding local-international interactions and 
issues of context, ownership and hybridity.
9
 Few, however, have begun to incorporate 
resistance into more meaningful analyses of post-conflict contexts, and even these could 
benefit from further theorization of resistance and more case study work that examines its 
specific manifestations in a variety of circumstantially dependent settings.
10
  
Using South Sudan as a case study, this dissertation addresses these shortcomings 
within the existing literature by locating resistance within the political economy of 
peacebuilding and development, particularly in relation the economic activities that are 
cast and informal, illicit and illegitimate within neoliberal orthodoxy. In doing so, this 
study makes a number of contributions to existing scholarship and policy debates. First, it 
addresses the virtual absence of scholarly literature on post-conflict South Sudan while 
adding a recent and so far neglected case study to the current literature on peacebuilding. 
                                                          
8
 A succinct overview of relevant criticisms can be found in: Richmond, Oliver ed. Palgrave Advances in 
Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010; Richmond, Oliver, The 
Transformation of Peace, New York: Palgrave, 2005; Paris (2004); and Richmond and Franks (2009).  
9
 For important works that focus on the value of local perspectives in post-conflict peacebuilding, see: 
Lederach, John Paul, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1995; and Pouligny, Béatrice, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local 
People, London, Hurst & Co., 2006. 
10
 Relevant studies will be explored in greater detail in the literature review provided in Chapter II of this 
dissertation.  
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Second, it builds on current trends within peacebuilding scholarship that seek to 
conceptualize and reinsert the phenomenon of resistance into post-conflict contexts. As 
critiques of contemporary peace operations commonly emphasize their failings and 
problematic nature in reference to global governance, understanding the various forms and 
methods of resistance that contest, subvert or present alternatives to specific applications of 
power is of significant scholarly and practical value. Finally, this study highlights the 
failings of neoliberal orthodoxy in addressing the economic dimensions of peacebuilding 
and reconstruction while stressing the need to reconsider informal, criminalized and 
delegitimized activities. Incorporating these into contemporary peace operations may 
violate many of the assumptions and principles that underpin dominant economic logic, but 
it is nevertheless essential for overcoming past failures and establishing a sustainable 
locally owned and contextually relevant peace.    
 
ii. Aims of this Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to locate the dynamics of power and resistance 
within the informal, criminalized and delegitimized political economies of post-conflict 
South Sudan. Specifically, neoliberal economic orthodoxy is problematized, and resistance 
to its hegemonic, universalist and normalizing functions is analyzed through a variety of 
actors, actions, spaces, discourses and processes that operate beyond liberal assumptions 
about formal, licit and legitimate economic logic. The implications that these various 
resistances have for peacebuilding and development are explored, and the necessity of 
reconsidering economic orthodoxy in post-conflict situations is emphasized. 
This study emphasizes the centrality of economic activity in resistance for a number 
of reasons. Economic factors have emerged as a major focus in the study of civil wars, 
bringing long neglected motives, actions, processes and methods of accumulation, 
extraction, production, distribution and subsistence into accounts of contemporary intra-
state conflict.
11
 A number of studies have explored the implications of these for post-
                                                          
11
 Much of this literature focuses on greed and grievance and the role of natural resources in armed conflict. 
The work of Paul Collier (occasionally with Anke Hoeffler and other co-authors) has been particularly 
influential. See: Collier, Paul, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
44 (6) 2000: 839-853; Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56 (4) 2004: 563-595; Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in 
Africa,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1) 2002: 13-28; Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic 
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conflict peacebuilding processes, enquiring into how the economic dimensions of civil 
wars can be suppressed, transformed or co-opted by reconstruction efforts.
12
 This study 
builds upon this literature, highlighting the disconnect between neoliberal economic 
orthodoxy and the economic realities of (post-)conflict situations. By contextualizing 
power and resistance within these dynamics, particularly the informal, criminalized and 
delegitimized dimensions of economic activity, it is possible to understand the limitations 
and deficiencies that define the theory and praxis of contemporary peace operations in a 
more complete way while also examining potential alternatives.  
These themes have important implications beyond the post-conflict contexts 
explored here. The extent to which the assumed benefits of ‘free’ markets, ‘free’ 
enterprise, ‘free’ trade, privatization and a minimal state are largely unquestioned in 
dominant policy discourse as a whole must be understood in terms of power and 
resistance.
13
 In this sense, the fiscal and monetary policies advocated by various actors—
including powerful state governments, private sector organizations and International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—do not refer to objective and universal 
economic laws derived from ideationally neutral positivist logic; instead, they represent 
dominant, value laden and contextually defined perspectives and interests that must be 
problematized and understood within broader processes that actualize global governance. 
Both globalization and development, the common ways in which neoliberal logics are 
internationally transmitted beyond their geographic core, are subject to important power 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61 (1) 2009: 1-
27; and Collier, Paul et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, Washington DC: 
World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003. Other key texts include: Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman 
eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2003; Berdal, Mats, “Beyond Greed and Grievance...And Not too Soon: A Review Essay,” Review of 
International Studies 31 (4) 2005: 687-698; Berdal, Mats and David Keen, “Violence and Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 26 (3) 1997: 795-
818; Berdal, Mats and David Malone eds., Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000; Keen, David, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge, Polity Press: 2008; Keen, David, The 
Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 320, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; 
Keen, David, “War and Peace: What’s the Difference?” International Peacekeeping 7 (4) 2000: 1-22. Where 
relevant, such debates will be engaged with in greater detail in later chapters.  
12
 These themes will be explored throughout this dissertation. For a brief introduction, see: Pugh, Michael, 
Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner eds., Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of 
Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
13
 The dominance of these concepts is outlined in Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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dynamics. For the former, the unregulated spread of predatory corporate capitalism into the 
peripheral spaces of the global market economy has resulted in exploitation, 
impoverishment and profound economic, political, social and environmental 
transformations.
14
 For the latter, the role that the international community plays in 
discursively producing, signifying, defining and externalizing underdeveloped spaces by 
privileging universalized systems of knowledge and understandings of modernity is 
emphasized in critical literature, as is the silencing of alternatives to a system that masks 
domination, power hierarchies and the pursuit of self-interest through neoliberal reforms 
and dependencies. An appropriate historicization of the concept of development reveals its 
postcolonial construction of foreign space as abnormal, ahistorical and yet saveable 
through the correction of its deficiencies, thereby justifying external intervention and 
governance.
15
 Economic orthodoxy is central to global manifestations of power; any 
understanding of resistance must take into account the interactions that define the various 
local applications of such dominant logic.
16
 
South Sudan has been chosen as a case study given the extent to which neoliberal 
logics have come to dominate its post-conflict economic system. Since gaining 
independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011 after two protracted civil wars (1955-1972 and 
1983-2005), South Sudan has been engaged in major peacebuilding, statebuilding and 
development projects with significant international involvement. The Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), along with its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA),
17
 have long embraced the security/peace/development nexus that dominates 
international discourse on peacebuilding, and its monopoly over the structures of 
government allows its leaders to adopt the neoliberal economic prescriptions of dominant 
                                                          
14
 Bauman, Zygmunt, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998; Bond, 
Patrick, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation, Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 
2006; Bush, Ray, Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South, London: 
Pluto Press, 2007; Chua, Amy, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic 
Hatred and Global Instability, London: Heinemann, 2004; Harrison, Graham, Neoliberal Africa: The Impact 
of Global Social Engineering, London: Zed Books, 2010; and Smith, Malinda S. ed., Globalizing Africa, 
Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 2003. 
15
 See: Crush, Jonathan ed., Power of Development, London: Routledge, 1995; Escobar, Arturo, 
Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995; and Kapoor, Ilan, The Postcolonial Politics of Development, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. 
16
 This claim will be explored in the literature review provided in Chapter II of this dissertation.  
17
 The SPLM and SPLA were, along with the Government of Sudan, the main actors in the Second Sudanese 
Civil War (1983-2005). The SPLM now forms the government of the independent South Sudan, with the 
SPLA transformed into the state’s regular military.   
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international orthodoxy with virtually no official opposition.
18
 The liberal peace has 
historically experienced minimal success in Sub-Saharan Africa, with neoliberal policies 
frequently criticized as, inter alia, contextually inappropriate and antithetical to peace and 
development.
19
 This dissertation explores how the various manifestations of power 
involved in such post-conflict liberalizations are engaged with in their individual local 
contacts, and specifically what role resistance plays in activities that are outside of the 
boundaries of liberal conceptions of acceptable and desirable economic activity.   
 
iii. Research Questions 
This study primarily addresses the following question: how can the interaction of 
power and resistance be conceptualized outside of the neoliberal economic systems of 
post-conflict orthodoxy? A number of related questions are also addressed: how are 
informal, illicit and illegitimate economic activities understood within dominant 
peacebuilding and development narratives, and what shortcomings do such 
understandings possess? Can participation in a variety of activities within such spheres be 
understood as resistance? Furthermore, what internal debates about socioeconomic issues 
exist within various segments of South Sudanese society, and what ramifications do these 
have for conceptualizing resistance? 
In addition to these, each chapter focuses on a variety of more specific questions as 
a means of exploring individual aspects of the political economy of resistance in South 
Sudan. These are intended to address the broader themes of this study in more intricate 
detail, investigating individual forms of resistance that allow for an appreciation of the 
depth and breadth of the concept as a whole. As this study stresses the heterogeneity of 
resistance, it therefore aims to harmonize macro and micro phenomena by situating 
individual occurrences into a broader theoretical understanding of resistance. The 
questions with which it engages are meant to facilitate this end.  
 
                                                          
18
 Johnson, Douglas H., The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Oxford: International African Institute and 
James Currey, 2003, 165-166. The security/peace/development nexus will be explored throughout this 
dissertation. See Duffield, Mark, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security, London: Zed Books, 2001a. 
19
 Taylor, Ian, “What Fit for the Liberal Peace in Africa?” Global Society 21 (4) 2007: 553-566; and Willett, 
Susan, “New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa,” Review of African Political 
Economy 32 (106) 2005: 569-594.  
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iv. Methodological Approach 
Methodological issues surrounding the study of resistance are highly contested. As 
this study stresses the conceptual malleability of resistance and seeks to locate its various 
manifestations within definable and concrete interactions with power, it also acknowledges 
the value of methodological diversity in the study of resistance. Qualitative research 
methods are employed here because of their descriptive and interpretive strengths, and 
particularly their epistemological and ontological underpinnings. This study rejects the 
focus on causal inference that guides much qualitative research and aims to circumscribe it 
within the strict boundaries of scientific enquiry, and instead emphasizes the centrality of 
individual narratives in understanding the subjectivity of phenomena and experience.
20
 In 
place of striving for objective empirical analysis, it questions the positivist assumption that 
it is possible to separate facts from values and subject from object, emphasizing the 
inseparability of the researcher’s positionality from his or her scholarly observations. In 
doing so, it seeks to move beyond problem-solving methods that legitimize power relations 
and fail to fundamentally question existing political, social and economic institutions and 
norms, stressing critical examination as key to emancipation.
21
 Individual perspectives and 
interpretation are central to understanding resistance; this study focuses on the multifarious 
narratives derived from these, aiming to reinsert those that are commonly overlooked into 
post-conflict economic orthodoxy. 
This dissertation seeks to analyze resistance in the political economy of South 
Sudan by engaging with a variety of primary and secondary resources in which these forms 
of resistance can be identified and further theorized.
22
 This analysis therefore employs 
                                                          
20
 The value of conforming qualitative research to the positivist principles of social science is most notably 
presented in King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. For relevant criticisms of this 
approach, see McKeown, Timothy, “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane 
and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,” International 
Organization 53 (1) 1999: 161-190. 
21
 Devetak, Richard, “Critical Theory,” in Theories of International Relations, by Scott Burchill and Andrew 
Linklater eds., Hampshire: MacMillan, 1996, 145-178. Positivist principles nevertheless continue to 
dominate International Relations methodology. For example, see Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E., 
Brady and David Collier, The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008.  
22
 Despite the value of multiple approaches to the study of resistance, certain methods that are commonly 
employed—namely ethnographic approaches such as participant observation and semi-structured or 
unstructured interviews—are beyond the scope of this study. Although this could have potential ramifications 
for a systematic analysis of certain forms of ‘everyday’ resistance, it should not be seen as a shortcoming. 
9 
 
documentary research to conceptualize resistance—understood as a collection of diverse 
methods of co-option, manipulation, subversion, rearticulation, avoidance, refusal, non-
participation and contestation—and identify its manifestations in a wide range of sources 
in order to locate its various sites of interaction with power. Publically available books, 
journals, reports, policy briefings, minutes from meetings, news and magazine articles, 
blogs and published interviews are all employed in this endeavour. In many of these 
sources, resistance is primarily identifiable in its absence; its lack of presence is 
conspicuous in the silencing of alternatives to dominant discourses. In others, resistance is 
present yet unidentified or not engaged with, and therefore must be acknowledged and 
reinscribed with meaning. This study seeks to conceptualize resistance in a way that allows 
for a meaningful analysis of its various forms while situating these within more general 
themes that are sensitive to context, complexity and nuance. Identifying the ways in which 
it is approached in relevant sources is central to understanding its existence in South Sudan 
and interactions with neoliberal economic orthodoxy.  
Such an approach offers a number of important advantages. Primarily, it allows the 
researcher to study resistance in a variety of forms and spaces, significantly benefiting 
conceptual diversity and scope. Flexibility is necessary for understanding resistance while 
respecting difference and complexity, and is an important strength of the methods adopted 
in this study. This approach also allows for an appropriate contextualization of definable 
moments and actions within broader, more holistic trends, connecting individual 
occurrences of resistance with larger themes at the domestic, regional or global level. 
Rather than simply focusing on macro or micro phenomena, individual resistances can be 
observed in a number of different manifestations, and these can be situated within a 
theoretical framework that identifies common trends and unites seemingly unrelated 
discourses, processes, events and actions. This is not to imply that these methods are 
without their limitations; issues of access and availability are especially important, both for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Beyond mere practicality, it should be stressed that ethnographic approaches to studying resistance involve 
significant methodological difficulties in relation to observability, definition and the authoring of the 
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the researcher and for those who may be excluded from discursive space. The problematic 
nature of representation and interpretation must also be noted, as a researcher’s attempts to 
(re)insert silenced or ignored voices, perspectives and ways of knowing into dominant 
narratives involves engaging with complex hierarchies and power relations that necessarily 
affect scholarly enquiry. Nevertheless, the methodological approach employed in this 
dissertation possesses the potential to allow for an appropriate understanding and study of 
resistance in the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan. Such an outcome, as 
suggested above, could provide a number of valuable contributions to existing scholarly 
literature and contemporary policy debates.     
 
v. Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is organized as follows.
23
 After Chapter I introduces the project, 
Chapter II outlines its theoretical underpinnings by reviewing the relevant literature on 
power and resistance in post-conflict contexts. In doing so, it seeks to explore broader 
conceptualizations of resistance that could expand upon current understandings of its 
processes and dynamics in contemporary peacebuilding and development operations. The 
ways in which resistance has been considered in related fields of literature is also 
addressed as a means of benefiting theoretical breadth and depth. Studies of neoliberalism, 
African history and postcolonialism are all examined for these purposes. Important debates 
surrounding the theory of resistance are engaged with in order to situate the arguments 
presented in this dissertation within current scholarly literature, and notable themes and 
deficiencies are highlighted that will be explored in greater detail throughout this work. 
The themes addressed here also provide the theoretical grounding for the remainder of the 
study.  
Each of the subsequent three chapters is aimed at investigating the variety of ways 
in which resistance becomes manifest in specific interactions beyond the sphere of 
economic activity that neoliberalism renders acceptable and desirable. Chapter III explores 
                                                          
23
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the role of informal economic activities in post-conflict South Sudan, discussing the 
reasons behind, and implications of, the lack of participation in the official private sector 
that is championed in dominant peacebuilding and development narratives. The dominance 
of neoliberal economic orthodoxy is outlined and problematized, and particular emphasis is 
given to actions outside of its structures, functions and logics. The roles that power and 
resistance both play in shaping the informal sector are considered, while the ambiguous 
role that neoliberalism plays in informal economies, the interaction of structure and agency 
and the issue of intent are identified as key factors in understanding informal economic 
activities in terms of resistance.  
Chapter IV scrutinizes unproblematized understandings of legitimate/illegitimate 
and licit/illicit economic activity that dominate post-conflict orthodoxy. These dichotomies 
are brought into question in two ways. First, the presence of corruption of South Sudan is 
outlined, and whether or not participation in corruption constitutes resistance is considered. 
The connection between corruption and coping strategies is emphasized, as is the 
relationship between corruption and neoliberalism as a means of critiquing arguments that 
present corruption as either a locally accepted form of action or the antithesis of 
functioning neoliberal economic logic. Second, debates surrounding land tenure in South 
Sudan are explored as an example of how economic processes that are considered legal and 
legitimate within neoliberal orthodoxy can encounter local resistance. The fact that a 
variety of actors can participate in both power and resistance is emphasized in order to 
undermine the overly simplistic equation of ‘the local’ with resistance and ‘the 
international’ with power. Understandings of legality and legitimacy are not apolitical or 
ahistorical, but are fundamentally tied to power and resistance and must be recognized as 
such.  
These concepts are spatialized in Chapter V, which seeks to outline the political 
economy of power and resistance in South Sudan’s borderlands. This is done in three 
distinct ways. First, South Sudan is presented as an international borderland that is 
excluded from political and economic power. South Sudan’s current peacebuilding and 
development projects threaten to solidify this marginalized status while the country is 
simultaneously (re)integrated into the international system through informal and illicit 
networks. Second, the role that informal transborder trade plays in shaping the economic 
12 
 
realities of South Sudan’s national borderlands is highlighted. The relationship between 
informal transborder trade and neoliberalism is explored, and the interaction of structure 
and agency is identified as the key variable for understanding informal transborder trade as 
resistance. Finally, spaces where the South Sudanese state has little resonance are 
examined. These internal borderlands are defined by the interaction of state authority and 
local power structures, demonstrating how power and resistance are characterized by 
subjectivity and hybridity.    
Chapter VI summarizes the arguments presented in this dissertation while offering 
conclusions and potential avenues for future research. A number of important issues and 
topics surrounding resistance, peace operations, neoliberalism and the political economy of 
South Sudan and (post-)conflict environments more generally remain unaddressed within 
existing literature, leaving considerable space for valuable scholarly endeavours. Some of 
the most important of these are outlined in an attempt to outline a future research agenda 
for the field while further considering the contributions of this dissertation to academic and 
policymaking communities. Again, this dissertation aims to reinsert resistance—
encompassing a variety of actors and methods—into the largely unproblematized 
discourses and processes that define the political economy of peacebuilding in South 
Sudan. If successful, the themes that it addresses could have important implications for the 
theory and praxis of contemporary peace operations. However modest these may be, they 
nevertheless merit the full focus of critical scholarly enquiry.    
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Chapter II: Conceptualizing Resistance 
Resistance is a theoretically rich and heterogeneous concept. The primary objective 
of this chapter is therefore to critically engage with relevant literature from a number of 
scholarly fields as a means of identifying ways in which resistance is conceptualized, 
studied and debated. In pursuit of this end, common understandings of resistance are 
highlighted, along with a number of tensions, inconsistencies and shortcomings that define 
the concept. Important debates surrounding issues such as intent, agency and, most 
importantly, the actors and methods involved are addressed, and a general framework for 
theorizing resistance is proposed. This section is primarily aimed at emphasizing the utility 
of understanding resistance in broad terms that gives special attention to diversity, nuance 
and definable interactions with varying manifestations of power. In this sense, there is 
significant value in exploring individual resistances—locatable moments, actions or 
physical, temporal and discursive spaces—in which power is contested, undermined or 
ignored. Power is a multifarious phenomenon and densely theorized concept; any 
understanding of resistance must be equally robust, flexible and sensitive to context and 
subjectivity.   
In order to address these themes, this chapter provides a concise overview and 
analysis of a number of key debates that dominate the literature surrounding the concept of 
resistance. It particularly focuses on the diversity of actors, methods and targets that can be 
involved in resistance, the interaction of structure and agency and issues surrounding intent 
as defining aspects of resistance, and concludes by outlining a theoretical framework for 
conceptualizing resistance that highlights and synthesizes these themes. 
As the very nature of resistance is both multi-disciplinary and ubiquitous, it would 
be impossible to address every author or work that has referred to it as an analytical or 
explanatory tool within the space afforded here. Thus, key theoretical texts that are directly 
relevant to understanding resistance in the political economy of South Sudan are given 
primacy in this literature review. This focus is intended to benefit concision without 
compromising breadth and depth, as the issues and themes engaged with here inform the 
theoretical approach employed throughout the remainder of this study.  
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i. International Relations, Political Economy and Resistance 
Common understandings of resistance often emphasize open contestations of 
power, frequently in the form of violent revolutions or other popular movements. These are 
largely coherent with many of the theoretical frameworks that traditionally dominate the 
field of International Relations—for example, realism and Marxism—and possess the 
advantage of facilitating analysis by virtue of their scale and public nature. An overview of 
current scholarly literature, however, reveals that the concept of resistance is much more 
varied than such understandings may imply. This section reviews the works of four 
theorists whose writings on resistance dominate relevant scholarship—Antonio Gramsci, 
Karl Polanyi, Michel Foucault and James C. Scott—as well as the ways in which their 
respective theories have been interpreted and employed by other authors who seek to apply 
them beyond their original contexts. This, indeed, is a common practice, as the works of 
these four theorists shape much of the literature discussed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter; this study itself engages in a similar effort. As a result, the intricacies of these 
theories deserve to be outlined and analyzed in considerable detail, and their implications 
for conceptualizing resistance should not be underestimated. 
Antonio Gramsci’s work provides an appropriate starting point for theorizing 
power and resistance. This must be understood within the context of how it engages with 
its Marxist roots, as while Gramsci adopts the broad theoretical tenets of Marxist analysis, 
he does so by employing a historical materialist approach that seeks to move beyond 
economic determinism while also reversing traditional Marxist emphases on a society’s 
economic base over its ideological superstructure and the importance of political society 
over civil society. Central to Gramsci’s approach is his understanding of hegemony. In 
societies in which hegemony is absent and different classes and interests compete for 
political dominance, Gramsci understands change as taking place within a ‘passive 
revolution’ that lacks popular support but is brought about through decisive individual 
action (‘caesarism’) or the formation of strategic coalitions (‘trasformismo’). In those 
where hegemony is present, conversely, it operates through various ‘historic blocs’—
comprising the collection of historically situated ideologies, institutions and material forces 
that dominate society—that connect political and civil society. For Gramsci, civil society is 
central to the hegemony of the dominant classes as it provides the space in which certain 
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ideologies and forms of behaviour that support their norms, values and interests can be 
disseminated. This constitutes a form of ‘common sense’ into which the working classes 
are co-opted as a means of ensuring their support for a system in which they are 
marginalized. Contradicting both Marxist and liberal approaches, Gramsci therefore 
(re)politicizes civil society as the space in which intellectual and moral domination takes 
place. Consent is more significant than coercion in this regard as hegemony is exercised 
through such seemingly neutral channels as education, religion, the media and other 
cultural spheres that define and produce universalized norms in order to justify and 
legitimize the status quo. Although the threat of force is constantly present in these 
societies, it is only selectively applied where hegemony breaks down; power’s basis in 
consent largely eliminates the necessity of overt oppression, with subservience primarily 
enforced intellectually and morally rather than through physical means.
24
  
Gramsci thus understands resistance in terms of the counter-hegemonic historic 
blocs that contest the prevailing ‘common sense’ and transform dominant relations of 
power. For Gramsci, open revolution directed against the state—referred to as a ‘war of 
movement’—would likely experience limited success in instances in which hegemony is 
exercised through civil society. Gaining control of the state would lack broad legitimacy 
and fail to engage with the primary manifestations of power. The importance of an 
ideological confrontation of the existing historic bloc by alternative social realities that 
reflect the interests of the working classes—termed a ‘war of position’—is therefore 
stressed as essential to the success of any attempts to engage with the status quo. This 
entails a transformation of both the dominant structures within a society as well as the 
consciousness of those within them. In this sense, a new historic bloc must be defined and 
emerge within the existing historic bloc in a way that allows the former to replace the 
latter. Intellectuals play an important role in this process, as does the Communist Party, 
which Gramsci views, following Machiavelli, as a ‘modern prince’ that is able to uncover 
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and embody the interests of the subordinate classes through constant engagement and 
dialogue, thus facilitating the establishment of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc that will 
not merely reverse existing hierarchies and hegemonic forces, but abolish them altogether. 
This would also involve the incorporation of political society into civil society, which is 
more sensitive to changing context than the historically situated institutions of the state. 
Thus, Gramsci re-envisions the Marxist objective of a stateless, classless society as one 
that is also constantly evolving and flexible in a way that responds to the interests of its 
members.
25
 
A number of authors have sought to apply Gramsci’s work to the field of 
International Relations. Robert Cox and Stephen Gill are particularly important here, both 
for building on Gramsci’s theories by applying them to the international system and for 
outlining a detailed research agenda with its own ontological and epistemological 
framework. These authors claim that such a project has a number of benefits: it 
conceptualizes global hegemony in both normative and material terms while 
acknowledging the role that structural and behavioural factors play in maintaining and 
altering these; it is able to explain structural changes within the international system and 
relate these to the actions of specific agents, thus moving beyond the conflict between 
structure and agency that pervades the social sciences; its focus on historicism is flexible 
and sensitive to context rather than theoretically rigid; and it provides for revolutionary 
alternatives to the dominant international political economy, emphasizing the possibility of 
emancipatory transformation through concerted action.
26
 Such efforts, however, have been 
criticized as either pseudo-Marxist or lacking the strengths of traditional Marxist accounts, 
and thus possessing the failures accompanying each; inappropriate for understanding the 
complex realities of the contemporary international system, particularly in relation to the 
constitution of current international structures; or inaccurate for over-emphasizing the 
power of transnational capital in a way that provides too little room for transformation.
27
 
Others, furthermore, claim that Neo-Gramscian approaches to International Relations 
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commonly ignore the significant debates surrounding interpretations of Gramsci’s work, 
failing to engage with its contested complexities and ambiguities; problematically 
internationalize his theories, removing his analysis from its original context in which the 
state is central; and over-estimate the explanatory power of Gramsci’s work for 
understanding contemporary global social realities.
28
 While responses to these criticisms 
have been presented by proponents of Neo-Gramscian analysis,
29
 debates surrounding the 
ability of Gramsci’s work to provide insights into the contemporary international system 
must be taken into account in any attempt to adopt it within more general studies of power 
and resistance. 
An alternative understanding of resistance can be discerned from Karl Polanyi’s 
writings on economic history. Most significant is his concept of the ‘double movement’, 
which frames the historical dynamics of the emergence of both the ‘self-regulating market’ 
and the forces, mechanisms and initiatives that have responded to it. The liberal market, for 
Polanyi, is not natural, self-governing or the result of laissez-faire, but rather had to be 
constructed from the late 18
th
 century along with the commodification of land, money and 
labour. According to Polanyi, this involved the separation of economic systems from the 
societies in which they were traditionally embedded, as the social networks that formerly 
provided the basis for production and distribution were replaced by economic logics 
governed by abstract market forces. Thus, the rise of the self-regulating market involved a 
reversal of the usual relationship between society and the economy, transforming the social 
embeddedness of economics into the economic embeddedness of social relations. This 
removal of the economy from its social roots, along with the fictitious commodification of 
individual and social goods that it entailed, had such disastrous consequences that it 
threatened the core human and organizational dimensions of society.
30
  
                                                          
28
 Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New 
Gramscians,” Review of International Studies 24 (1) 1998: 3-21. Similar criticisms are presented in Worth, 
Owen, “The Poverty and Potential of Gramscian Thought in International Relations,” International Politics 
45 (6) 2008: 633-649.  
29
 Rupert, Mark, “(Re-)Engaging Gramsci: A Response to Germain and Kenny,” Review of International 
Studies 24 (3) 1998: 427-434; and Bieler and Morton (2004). 
30
 Polanyi’s arguments are primarily advanced in Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon, 2001. Also see: Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney, 
“Towards an Ethnological IPE: Karl Polanyi’s Double Critique of Capitalism,” Millennium—Journal of 
International Studies 28 (2) 1999: 311-340; Maertens, Eppo, “Polanyi’s Double Movement: A Critical 
Reappraisal,” Social Thought and Research 29 (1) 2008: 129-153; and Birchfield (1999). 
18 
 
Importantly, for Polanyi, the expansion of the self-regulating market inspired 
parallel attempts and measures to limit its spread as a means of protecting both individual 
wellbeing and existing social systems. These ‘countermovements’ were spontaneous, 
ideologically diverse and in response to unrelated causes and interests; what united them 
was the fact that they primarily sought to address concerns related to professional status, 
personal safety and security, the type of life one is able to lead and the ability to situate 
oneself within a stable social environment. Thus, although Polanyi acknowledges the 
important role that economic factors played in shaping their objectives, these were 
secondary to, and indeed inseparable from, common social considerations. By influencing 
legislation and reforms while maintaining or creating new social systems that could 
mitigate the effects of the self-regulating market, such efforts were ultimately able to 
prevent the realization of the liberal ideal of complete market hegemony. It is in the 
context of this double movement—the liberal push to disembed the economy from society 
and the collection of initiatives that emerged in response to this—that one can 
conceptualize the role of power and resistance in Polanyi’s work. In this sense, liberal 
attempts to construct laissez-faire markets are shown to involve a high degree of 
intervention and planning, contradicting the teleological and natural pretences of the liberal 
market while undermining the pervasive claim that any failures that result from 
marketization should be addressed through further economic liberalization. Resistance, in 
contrast, can be located within the countermovements that emerge in response to market 
forces and subvert their hegemonic, homogenizing and beneficial claims. Both the 
processes and logics of liberal economics are challenged by these forces as not only is the 
self-regulating market limited by efforts to curtail its social effects, but the assumption that 
strict economic rationality guides individual action and governs society is also challenged 
by emphasizing human agency and the contextual factors that shape it. The preservation of 
society thus becomes a site of resistance to the totalizing functions of the liberal market, 
with collective action as the primary method of transformation.
31
  
Michel Foucault’s theories have been employed to understand resistance more 
generally. Central to Foucault’s understanding of resistance is his understanding of power. 
For Foucault, the issue of power is fundamentally tied to the production of reified systems 
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of knowledge with scientific pretences, the objectification of individual or collective 
subjects and the processes through which individuals undergo self-subjectivation.
32
 These 
are related to, respectively, the emergence of disciplines surrounding life, labour and 
language that evolve based on historical context; the definition and division of subjects 
along with the historical development of prisons, medicine, psychiatry and sexuality; and 
the processes of self-formation that are related to these.
33
 Power, for Foucault, is therefore 
productive rather than simply negative, and can be understood through various actions 
upon other actions that seek to influence the scope or circumstances in which certain 
actions can take place. Power employs both violence and consent, and is fundamentally 
tied to his understandings of knowledge and discourse.
34
 Foucault suggests that a number 
of points are central for understanding power relations: the differentiations that legitimize 
power and the systems that enshrine these; the objectives of specific applications of power; 
the means by which power is exercised; the institutions through which power operates; and 
the rationalizations that characterize individual manifestations of power.
35
  
Foucault’s work also explores these themes within the context of neoliberalism. In 
this regard, his concepts of biopower—the production and subjectivation of human bodies 
for the purposes of discipline and regulation—and governmentality—the rationalities and 
technologies that governments employ to promote traits within a population that facilitate 
governance—are central. Foucault locates the roots of contemporary neoliberalism in 18th 
century critiques of sovereign authority over economic activity, tracing its development 
through German ordoliberalism and the Chicago School. The problem of total market 
knowledge was central to these claims; given the supposed impossibility of centralized 
state control over the complexities of a system dominated by rational economic actors, new 
technologies of power had to be employed to influence the characteristics of populations 
and regulate individual behaviour. Thus, for Foucault, although economic liberalism 
minimizes the direct role of the state in the market, it simultaneously involves the 
production of the economic subject—homo oeconomicus—that is governed by the 
rationalities of the market and will act to serve its functions. Juridical structures and civil 
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society both play an important role in this government of action.
36
 These theories, 
however, remain somewhat underdeveloped and even ambiguous: a number of authors 
have employed Foucault’s work to critique contemporary neoliberalism, exploring its 
implications and addressing any perceived shortcomings in the process;
37
 others, however, 
reject such a project, claiming, for example, that Foucault viewed economic liberalism as 
coherent with his anti-humanism, and therefore endorsed it for the brief period during 
which his related Collège de France lectures took place.
38
 
Despite this understanding of power as totalizing and universal, Foucault also 
theorizes space in which resistance to power can take place. It is perhaps possible to divide 
the development of Foucault’s understanding of resistance into three distinct phases. First, 
Foucault’s early work focuses on the transgression and contestation of the limits imposed 
by established dichotomies that inform dominant discourse and action. The negation of 
these is seen as the immediate objective of resistance, while discussion of alternatives or 
specific methods is limited. The second phase of Foucault’s understanding of resistance is 
characterized by a renewed emphasis on Marxism and revolutionary action. This phase 
involves a critique of the social institutions that seek to define and normalize human 
subjects, along with the ideologies that legitimize these. Here, Foucault highlights the 
importance of ‘subjugated knowledges’—the experiences of those who have been the 
subjects of specific applications of power—for revealing hidden technologies of power. 
Intellectuals also have an important role in exposing these power relations, providing a 
genealogy of their historical evolution and critiquing them in a way that provides space for 
the knowledges that they silence. The destabilization caused by these processes is intended 
to allow for open contestations to existing institutions of power, specifically those relating 
to education, psychiatry and justice, and ultimately expanding to engage with other local 
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applications of power. The methods and movements involved in these must be specific to 
individual interactions, and thus cannot be more broadly theorized. Finally, Foucault came 
to stress resistance as reflecting the diffuse and productive nature of power, existing in 
various forms wherever power is present.
39
 In this regard, Foucault’s early emphasis on a 
‘tactical reversal’—the exploitation of the mechanisms and internal tensions that define 
systems of power as a means of resistance—later shifted to a focus on the ‘aesthetics of 
existence’, ‘self-care’ and ‘technologies of the self’ that involve multiple forms of 
individual subjectivity and critical agency. For Foucault, these continuous 
(re)constructions of the self are able to provide alternatives to existing power relations 
based on discipline and regulation through subjectivation. According to Foucault, the 
processes involved in desubjectivation cannot be universalized; as it seeks to break down 
precisely what limits human action and bring all dominant discourses and knowledges into 
question, it is necessarily non-prescriptive. The radical redefinition of the self that it 
entails, however, moves beyond earlier understandings of resistance as merely a critique of 
power, emphasizing the importance of the individual in the process.
40
  
These approaches to Foucault’s work, however, have been criticized, as some claim 
that Foucault fails to adequately outline how resistance to his theories of power can be 
undertaken. Such criticisms regard current scholarly emphasis on Foucauldian technologies 
of the self as misguided, suggesting that these have an ambiguous relationship to his 
understanding of technologies of power and cannot be understood in terms of resistance.
41
 
Contrary to these claims, however, Foucault’s work seems to provide a theoretical basis for 
understanding resistance as it theorizes power and outlines ways in which its 
manifestations can be contested.  Although the methods involved in this may be diverse, 
they are united by a number of commonalities that Foucault himself identifies: they exist 
transnationally; they target specific exercises of power; they focus on immediate 
manifestations of power and short-term contestations; they concern individual rights and 
oppose the constraints and definitions involved in individualization; they target knowledge 
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claims and the power relationships that are connected to these; and they centre on the issue 
of individual identity, rejecting abstract, universalist claims based on ideological or 
scientistic discourses and enforced through administration or state violence.
42
 Two 
important considerations nevertheless need to be stressed. First, according to Foucault, 
freedom must necessarily be present for power to operate, as the ability of a subject to 
undertake a variety of actions is a precondition for these actions to be influenced. Thus 
power and freedom are not oppositional, but are rather mutually present and socially 
ubiquitous.
43
 Second, these forms of resistance are not necessarily emancipatory; indeed, 
resistance is often co-opted in a way that masks domination. This can be overcome if the 
means of co-option are themselves co-opted by resistance, but such a process can often be 
difficult to discern.
44
  
Finally, the work of James C. Scott is also relevant here. In notable contrast to the 
theories discussed above, Scott’s work is rooted in an anthropological analysis of everyday 
forms of resistance that seeks to move beyond the common scholarly focus on the rare 
historical moments in which peasant communities openly and violently contest the 
authority of the state and the rigid international system. Scott thus concentrates his analysis 
on actions that may not constitute outright confrontation—including obstructionism, 
deception, subversion, evasion, mimicry, insincere consent and deference, feigned 
ignorance, verbal critique, petty theft, vandalism and sabotage—but nevertheless resist the 
application of power. These forms of everyday resistance often depart from the public and 
large-scale objectives that characterize formal and open defiance, and are frequently 
concerned with personal short-term gain in a way that is both spontaneous and independent 
of other actions. Self-preservation, subsistence and access to basic resources are all 
emphasized here, as are, importantly, political economy issues, including social hierarchies 
and oppressive and exploitative patron-client relationships, dominant systems of labour 
and production and other local manifestations of class relations.
45
 Political economy 
transformations are also central to Scott’s work, including ‘development’, colonialism, 
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state formation and top-down social engineering, all of which engender resistance from 
those who wish to escape or mitigate their ill effects.
46
  
Scott’s arguments also involve a differentiation of what he refers to as ‘hidden’ and 
‘public transcripts’, or contrasting discourses that are employed in different ways 
depending on context, purpose and audience. According to Scott, public transcripts refer to 
the dominant discursive system that is used formally and openly in the application of 
power. This is defined by elites and aims to normalize and legitimize their authority while 
justifying or ignoring the negative consequences of their privilege. Claims that those at the 
top of the hierarchies it supports represent the interests of those at the bottom are usually 
central to this discourse, and although the resonance of this is always incomplete, it is not 
completely lacking in popular support. The performative aspects of power are thus central 
in the assertion of its (unrealized) hegemony. This public transcript interacts with 
subordinate discourses in four distinct ways. First, the oppressed can invoke these 
dominant public discourses, and even co-opt them for their own purposes. Second, away 
from their oppressors, subordinated groups often employ a hidden transcript in which they 
openly discuss their dissatisfaction with the status quo. Anger, revenge and direct 
refutations of dominant discourse all characterize these. Importantly, it is not merely 
through the hidden transcripts of the subordinate that the official public transcript breaks 
down; indeed, those who exercise power also construct a concealed discourse that involves 
the modes, logics and aims of their domination that cannot be revealed publically. The 
third form of interaction takes place within the space that exists between public and hidden 
transcripts, as hidden transcripts are partially articulated publically but referred to in ways 
that mask their subversive nature. Scott locates much of the culture of the oppressed within 
this space, including folk stories, traditional songs and rituals, along with jokes, 
euphemisms and rumors that subvert the assumptions of power. Finally, the division 
between public and hidden transcripts can, at times, break down when the latter is 
articulated openly in the presence of power, often resulting in either an attempt to silence it 
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or, in the absence of this, continuing instances in which the oppressed ‘speak truth to 
power’.47   
According to Scott, domination therefore exists in three primary forms: material, 
which involves control of land, labour, capital and goods; status, which involves social 
marginalization and exclusion as well as direct derision as a means of belittlement; and 
ideological, which serves to justify the privilege of some groups at the expense of others. 
Each is resisted both publically and through what Scott terms ‘infrapolitics’, the forms of 
resistance that are commonly unrecognized as such. Publically, material domination can be 
resisted through collective action involving petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, 
land seizures and revolution; status domination through either conforming to the standards 
and practices that are seen to display privilege or directly attacking symbols of power; and 
ideological domination through counter-ideologies that challenge the legitimacy of claims 
to rule while emphasizing inclusion, equality or revolution. The infrapolitics of subordinate 
groups also constitute resistance to these, with material domination resisted through 
everyday forms of resistance or direct resistance by anonymous participants; status 
domination through hidden transcripts; and ideological domination through the creation of 
subordinate culture.
48
  
Scott’s arguments thus represent an important critique of Gramsci’s claim that the 
consciousness of the oppressed is dominated by a form of hegemony that renders them 
unable to recognize the revolutionary potential of their actions; instead, Scott contends that 
hegemony involves little ideational permeation, with action constrained by power to a far 
more significant extent than thought. For Scott, Gramsci’s formulation must therefore be 
reversed, as hegemony can be, and indeed is, most easily resisted in ideological terms, 
even while the scope of action of the oppressed is limited.
49
 Scott’s work similarly 
represents a rejection of accounts that neglect human agency in favour of structural factors, 
emphasizing the range of action and potential for self-definition—even if shaped, 
importantly, by economic and other circumstances—that all subjects of analysis possess. 
Also important here is the extent to which Scott’s understanding of resistance focuses on 
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the issue of intent, specifically to either reject the demands of a certain individual or group 
or to advance counterclaims that contradict the status quo. For Scott, what unites a broad 
range of seemingly disparate actions that are classified as resistance is therefore their 
original meanings rather than actual outcomes. Although there are, as he acknowledges, 
both practical problems associated with uncovering the initial intention of an action as well 
as conceptual challenges in separating the aim of resistance from other short-term gains 
that the same action may entail, he also insists that traditional distinctions between 
organized and individual behaviour, political and self-interested actions, revolutionary and 
non-revolutionary implications and actions against or within the systems of domination 
that characterize approaches to resistance are conceptually inadequate. For Scott, 
understanding resistance in such a way severely limits conceptual scope while ignoring the 
complexities that characterize its multiple dimensions.  
 
ii. Peacebuilding and Resistance 
Many of these themes have been addressed in recent works on contemporary 
peacebuilding operations. In this regard, Oliver Richmond’s work is of particular relevance 
for a number of reasons. Importantly, its genealogy of peace suggests that contemporary 
liberal understandings are informed by several distinct yet overlapping discursive systems 
that are highly contradictory and inconsistent, and that these disguise forms of domination 
that undermine the success of efforts to promote lasting peace in post-conflict situations. 
Such a historicization allows the liberal peace paradigm, which dominates current 
peacebuilding theory and practice, to be considered in terms of its commonly ignored or 
unquestioned discursive and conceptual roots, revealing the problematic nature of its 
theoretical, methodological, epistemological, ontological and ideational underpinnings. 
According to Richmond, although peace operations balance the methods, interests and 
ownership of international and local actors to varying degrees in different post-conflict 
situations, they have nevertheless come to centre on the concept of peace-as-governance, 
which focuses on (re)building and restructuring the state, refashioning society and 
regulating individual action in accordance with liberal understandings of how each of these 
should operate. Peacebuilding, he argues, has been co-opted into the means and ends of 
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statebuilding, including its focus on power, constitutionalism, institutionalism and civil 
society, resulting in a virtual peace with minimal popular support or resonance.
50
 
Richmond’s problematization of liberal peacebuilding in terms of the Foucauldian 
concepts of governmentality and biopower is central to these arguments, as it casts the 
promotion of post-conflict orthodoxy as a radical attempt to define and construct foreign 
societies and individuals in terms of liberal knowledges, interests and forms of control. 
Power in contemporary peace operations must therefore be understood in terms of the 
regulation of human life and behaviour through the production of governable subjectivities 
and the promotion of liberal forms of action and organization. Such an understanding 
provides suitable conceptual space in which resistance can be theorized, which Richmond 
explores in the context of emancipatory forms of peacebuilding. Following Foucault, 
subjugated knowledges, epistemologies, ontologies and perspectives that are marginalized 
by power, but nevertheless remain able to reformulate political realities through the 
empowerment of disparate and silenced critical agencies, are seen as central to a form of 
resistance that is located at the ‘local-local’ level that exists beyond the scope of liberal 
conceptions of society and politics. The everyday forms of resistance that these involve—
referred to by Richmond as, following Scott, the ‘infrapolitics of peacebuilding’—
fundamentally undermine, and expose the weaknesses of, the local applications of power 
that characterize peacebuilding. These conceptual and practical disjunctures, Richmond 
argues, suggest the existence of a ‘post-liberal peace’ focused on Foucauldian technologies 
of the self, empathy and the everyday, and characterized by hybridity, ‘local-local’ 
ownership, broad-based plurality and a respect for context, subjectivity, consensus and 
individual understandings of justice, welfare, rights and political organization.
51
  
The interaction between various dynamics of power and resistance in contemporary 
peace operations has also been explored by Roger Mac Ginty. Seeking to move beyond 
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approaches that focus on ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ methods and either fail to critically 
analyze the effects of liberal internationalism or romanticize indigeneity,
52
 Mac Ginty 
emphasizes the essential complexity and heterogeneity of perspectives in (post-)conflict 
situations, suggesting that any reference to discrete, homogeneous and static categories is 
conceptually problematic. In doing so, he outlines a conceptual model of local/liberal 
hybridization in internationally driven peacebuilding programs, claiming that individual 
aspects of peace are shaped by the varying interactions of four constantly changing factors: 
the ability of international actors to ensure compliance; the incentivizing powers of 
international actors that encourage co-operation; the ability of local actors to resist, subvert 
or co-opt international efforts for their own ends; and the ability of local actors to provide 
viable, contextually relevant alternatives to externally designed and enforced programs.
53
 
Mac Ginty’s work also questions common assumptions that frame local responses to peace 
operations within the opposing categories of compliance and resistance, arguing that non-
participation is a distinct phenomenon and deserves to be analyzed as such. In doing so, it 
outlines a typology of non-participation, which is conceptualized in both voluntary and 
involuntary terms. Voluntary non-participation can be based on principle, a tactical choice 
in order to realize a larger strategic goal, a rational choice based on the belief that the 
benefits of participation will be minimal or a simple lack of interest. Involuntary non-
participation, conversely, can be the result of suppression and purposeful attempts to limit 
the influence of certain groups, deeply ingrained norms against participation, a lack of 
security, individual incapacity or a personal retreat into the private realm based on the 
desire for normalcy.
54
 
Despite the utility that these works have for conceptualizing resistance in 
contemporary peace operations, their arguments should be compared to those that approach 
such issues from a perspective that is more grounded in critical political economy. Of 
particular importance here is Mark Duffield’s argument that development, as underwritten 
by the logic of the ‘New Wars’ thesis, is part of a broader project of global governance that 
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seeks to transform foreign societies and peoples as a means of ensuring global stability. 
According to Duffield, the increasing interconnectedness of the global core of liberal 
states, and the marginalization of peripheral states from the traditional international 
economy that this entails, is paralleled by the growth of transborder economic activity that 
exists beyond the self-defined spheres of liberalism, yet is fundamentally linked to its 
processes and logics. Rather than representing a regressive form of modernity or 
development, this should be seen as a reflexive, resistant form of globalization and 
modernization defined by new political complexes with their own (illiberal) forms of 
regulation and authority. There is a considerable degree of ambivalence in this plurality of 
reactive, creative modernities, and although they fail to conform to external expectations or 
policy objectives, they nevertheless represent a real form of development in spaces that are 
simultaneously excluded from and incorporated into the contours of globalization. Cast 
against the supposed chaos and regression that is seen to characterize these forms of 
reflexive modernity, the logics of aid have been redirected towards the promotion of 
liberally defined order and stability. This securitization of development, Duffield suggests, 
is largely defined by its recent shift in focus from states to individuals, involving the 
biopolitical governance of human life within liberally defined boundaries of acceptable 
action in a way that ossifies the global ‘life-chance divide’ that development, at least 
rhetorically, seeks to mitigate.
55
  
The work of Michael Pugh similarly locates resistance in activities that violate the 
tenets of neoliberal globalization. Stressing the extent to which the Washington Consensus 
of neoliberal economic prescriptions has come to dominate the rationale of peacebuilding, 
Pugh argues that local forms of economic organization and welfare are ignored in 
accordance with the logics of liberal teleology and market determinism. Orthodox debates, 
in this sense, take place within a liberally defined problem-solving paradigm that fails to 
question issues of structural violence, the objectivist and neutralist pretenses of economic 
theory and the assumed benefits of deregulation, the privatization of state assets, reduced 
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government revenues and expenditures, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the promotion 
of entrepreneurship. The externally driven market reforms that these entail are framed 
within a form of disciplinary governance that overlooks the possibility of viable, locally 
constructed modes of production and distribution, with ‘curing strangeness’ as a key 
objective for normalization and partial integration into the unequal global capitalist 
system.
56
 Locating resistance within these dynamics, Pugh references the functional and 
disruptive role of local agencies that become manifest in the informal and illicit activities 
that thrive in the absence of essential employment and welfare programs. These can be 
understood, he claims, in terms of a postcolonial hybridity that arises from the ambivalence 
of international/local interaction; as international actors disavow their governing functions, 
they create a lack of stability in which the subaltern is given space for agency and 
resistance.
57
  
Beyond these, a number of recent studies have explored the perspectives and 
experiences of the subjects of peace operations. These not only address issues of 
legitimacy for international interventions, but also serve to highlight the disconnect 
between the expectations and desires of local and international actors regarding the means 
and ends of such missions. While some of these works do not explicitly explore the 
concept of resistance, the responses that they outline can nevertheless be employed to 
understand the various ways in which resistance becomes manifest in peace operations, 
including threats and outright violence, protests and demonstrations, manipulation, 
avoidance, obstructionism, press campaigns, minor acts such as vandalism, various 
attempts to influence public discourse and the creation or maintenance of alternative social 
systems. These can be employed by a number of groups, including state governments, 
‘spoilers’ who seek to undermine a peace process, political or economic entrepreneurs, 
local communities and civil society groups representing disparate and sometimes 
competing interests. Similarly, they can surround a wide range of issues, varying from the 
presence of the international community—resulting from its perceived oppressive or 
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neocolonial nature, aloofness, arrogance, lack of local knowledge and sensitivity and 
disengagement from the population, often symbolized by a noticeable physical and 
material divide that separates internationals and locals—to land disputes, the 
implementation of justice, mandated political and economic reforms, the social and 
economic impact of peace missions and issues of disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR).
58
  
Despite the important differences outlined here, it therefore seems possible to 
identify a number of commonalities that characterize these works. Principally, the critical 
approach to peacebuilding employed by each allows for a valuable problematization of the 
role that power plays in defining, normalizing and seeking to govern the externalized 
illiberal other. The incompleteness of such efforts, however, is also highlighted, providing 
space in which resistance can be located. These works conceptualize resistance in a variety 
of ways, encompassing a diverse collection of actors and actions. Taken in combination, 
they provide a firm foundation on which to base an understanding of resistance in post-
conflict situations. They must, nevertheless, be considered in comparison to works that 
have theorized resistance in a variety of related fields, as such an undertaking can only 
benefit the conceptual depth and fortitude of this nascent body of literature.  
 
iii. Neoliberalism and Resistance 
The body of literature that can be broadly categorized as ‘anti-globalization’59 is 
particularly useful for understanding resistance in post-conflict situations as it assigns 
primacy to economic issues while theorizing space for resistance to contemporary forms of 
neoliberal internationalism. Much of this work is dominated by theoretical approaches that 
seek to define emancipatory alternatives to dominant political and economic logic, 
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including neo-Gramscian analyses that aim to outline the contours of existing counter-
hegemonic forces that can contest and provide alternatives to the cultural hegemony of the 
transnational capitalist class;
60
 critical theory approaches that attempt to problematize the 
assumptions that define globalization and highlight the historical, social and political 
situatedness of its theories and knowledges for the purposes of transformation;
61
 
postcolonial theories that aim to (re)politicize and (re)historicize neoliberal globalization, 
emphasizing the inseparability of economic and cultural domination while acknowledging 
the importance of individual agencies for providing alternatives to the fundamental 
incompleteness of its universalist logics;
62
 and feminist analyses that frame globalization in 
a gendered context and reveal the relationship that its functions have for perpetuating and 
spreading oppressive patriarchal hierarchies.
63
 These and other approaches commonly 
focus on identifying various movements and moments that contest the international spread 
of neoliberalism in its different manifestations, including the practices of multinational 
corporations (MNCs), government policies and international organizations and agreements. 
In doing so, they highlight the transnational local-global linkages that connect these 
seemingly disparate contestations, concentrating on a broad range of diverse civil society 
groups, activists, indigenous communities and labour movements that oppose, in whole or 
in part, the political, economic, social and cultural transformations involved in neoliberal 
globalization, and the extent to which these actors are able to use the products and effects 
of globalization—increased interconnectedness, ease of travel, access to information and 
communication and technological advances—to their advantage. Advocacy campaigns, 
conferences, reform efforts, boycotts, protests, rallies, demonstrations and violent 
confrontations are all, in various ways, advanced as methods of resistance, commonly 
framed in terms democracy, justice and rights. Resistance, in this sense, is a form of broad-
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based ‘globalization-from-below’ that is sensitive to cultural diversity and a variety of 
social, economic and environmental issues, contesting neoliberal ‘globalization-from-
above’ by providing alternatives to its failings.64  
Importantly, some authors have questioned the efficacy of framing these resistances 
as a counter to the hegemony of neoliberalism, highlighting the practical and conceptual 
difficulties involved in understanding them as representative of global agency and an 
alternative international system. Their transformative potential has been challenged, both 
in terms forming a common consensus and influencing dominant discourses.
65
 
Nevertheless, ‘anti-globalization’ literature provides valuable insights into a number of 
themes that are relevant for understanding the political economy of resistance in 
contemporary peace operations. First, in focusing on specific movements and moments of 
resistance and conceptualizing these within a broader theoretical framework, it supplies a 
research agenda that is largely appropriate for studying contestations surrounding global 
neoliberalism more generally. The neoliberal reforms involved in current peacebuilding 
projects should be contextualized within these broader dynamics. Second, it moves beyond 
the teleology and economic determinism that characterizes much of the analysis of 
neoliberalism, emphasizing contingency, circumstance and human action while 
acknowledging the relationship between economics and social, political, cultural and 
identity issues. Third, it explores the interaction between structure and agency by 
highlighting how each is able to constitute the other. The extent to which collective values, 
interests and perspectives are shaped by existing socioeconomic realities, institutions and 
discourses is essential for understanding the interaction of power and resistance, as is the 
possibility that these can be transformed through various forms of human action. The 
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methods involved range from direct and open confrontation to subversion, refusal and non-
compliance, each framed in terms of a specific objective for challenging neoliberal 
globalization and, in many cases, proposing viable alternatives based on popular ownership 
and subjective understandings of rights and justice. Finally, even the critiques of this 
literature have significant value as they represent the inherent difficulties in relating 
different actors and methods in a unified understanding of resistance. This emphasizes the 
need to move beyond the dichotomization of power and resistance into two opposing 
homogeneous categories, and instead attempt to identify the various actors, interests, 
causes and objectives that define individual resistances. Each of these is directly applicable 
to the themes explored in this study. 
 
iv. African History, Postcolonialism and Resistance 
Resistance is also a highly debated topic in scholarly studies of African history, and 
engaging with this literature can provide an appropriate historicization of the processes, 
actors, discourses and dynamics that are relevant to this study. Early studies of resistance 
in Africa focused on direct resistance to colonialism, either through violent revolutions or 
nationalist struggles for independence. Questions of continuity between different 
movements, understanding collaboration and the role of ideology were all important here. 
A Marxist focus on class also emerged as central to this analysis, shifting an emphasis to 
the injustices of the global capitalist system as the primary cause and target of resistance. 
Such approaches, however, became subject to criticism as overly focused on elites and too 
Eurocentric, thus ignoring the agencies of African actors and the diversities that defined 
these, and as a result, subsequent endeavours came to eschew top-down histories in favour 
of those that give centrality to various African perspectives and experiences. Thus, more 
contemporary accounts have broadened the concept of resistance beyond the overt actions 
of ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘revolutionaries’, incorporating and adding nuance to rigid 
categories by analyzing internal divisions amongst those who resist and the various goals 
and individual motives that shape specific actions. More traditional understandings of 
resistance have been replaced by new narratives on African conflict, including those that 
emphasize understandings of ‘New Wars’, ‘warlords’, ‘greed and grievance’ or ‘new 
barbarism’; youth grievances and internal social factors; debates about the interpretation of 
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the causes, rationalities and nature of violence; the role of culture and discourse over 
ideology; and the importance of identity and multiple power relations.
66
 In doing so, many 
of these works have employed the theories of power and resistance outlined above as a 
means of understanding similar themes in a variety of African contexts. The 
appropriateness of this may be debateable considering the extent to which these theories 
emphasize context and were originally formulated in reference to radically different 
political, historical, cultural and socioeconomic factors;
67
 indeed, dominant approaches to 
resistance in African history as a whole have been criticized as conceptually problematic 
due to their perceived inability to take into account complex social realities.
68
     
The field of postcolonial studies can perhaps provide important insights into 
overcoming this conceptual and contextual impasse. The foundational text of this body of 
literature, Edward Said’s Orientalism, outlines an understanding of power that is exercised 
through the discursive production and definition of the foreign other in a way that 
externalizes it from a similarly constructed ‘self’. Domination, in this sense, has important 
ontological and epistemological dimensions, as power is fundamentally tied to knowledge 
claims that are legitimized within common discursive structures. Said’s work thus engages 
with both Foucault’s understanding of power and Gramsci’s emphasis on cultural 
hegemony through civil society, highlighting the importance of each in shaping the 
representations that define power. Textual analysis is central for uncovering the 
assumptions and hierarchies that underlie these (re)productions. In this regard, Said 
significantly rejects Foucault’s devaluation of the importance of the author, instead 
emphasizing the relationship between an individual text and the discursive system that it 
simultaneously references and reworks.
69
 Subsequent postcolonial studies have sought to 
address the depiction of the colonized as passive recipients in the process of identity 
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formation, highlighting their agency while attempting to (re)insert their experiences into 
dominant discourses and histories.
70
 Perhaps most significant in this regard is Homi 
Bhabha’s notion that dominant epistemologies, self/other identity dichotomies and systems 
of domination are inherently unstable, ambivalent and hybridized in their contacts with the 
foreign other.
71
 Applications of these theories to African contexts, however, remain 
limited, and important questions surround their explanatory and analytical efficacy in such 
an endeavour. Nevertheless, existing works that emphasize discursivity, intertextuality and 
the production of subjectivities reveal the power linkages that connect the colonial past 
with the postcolonial present. In doing so, they also open up space in which resistance can 
be situated through the contestation of dominant discourses and identities, emphasizing the 
centrality of culture, narratives and self-authorship in this process.
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v. Towards a Conceptual Model 
This overview of the relevant literature provides a basis on which an appropriate 
general framework for conceptualizing resistance can be presented. Primarily, resistance 
will be conceptualized in this study as any attempt to affect power, whether in its specific 
applications or more generally, so as to mitigate, redirect or otherwise influence its effects, 
by an individual or collection or actors for a specific, identifiable political or non-political 
purpose. Considered in terms of its central themes, the framework employed in this study 
can be outlined as follows:  
 
1. Actors: Both individuals and groups can participate in resistance. Although much of 
the relevant literature, for obvious reasons, focuses on acts of resistance by the 
oppressed or marginalized, a more useful understanding of resistance must recognize 
that any individual, regardless of his or her status or position, who contests power, 
along with any group, regardless of its influence or motives, that does the same, is 
participating in resistance. It is also important to note that identity is a malleable and 
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subjective concept, and one can indeed possess multiple identities simultaneously 
regardless of how contradictory these may seem. Although this perhaps complicates 
clear categorization, it does not significantly detract from the merits of such a 
process. This study therefore incorporates the following typology: 
a. International Actors: those who represent foreign governments, international 
government organizations (IGOs), IFIs, private corporations and global civil 
society groups, who resist official orthodoxy. 
b. National Actors: those who dominate the social, economic, political and 
cultural aspects of the domestic sphere while being based in that country. 
These include high-ranking members of the state apparatus, encompassing 
government leaders and legislative, judicial and military officials; private 
sector members, specifically prominent business leaders; civil society 
representatives, including cultural figures, respected intellectuals and 
academics, religious leaders and members of large non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs); and those who fall outside of such categories but 
maintain national importance, particularly traditional/ethnic leaders or 
powerful members of non-state military groups.  
c. Community Actors: local actors who lack national authority or recognition, but 
nevertheless represent and/or possess the ability to influence a certain group. 
Community actors can be local government officials, whether elected 
representatives, unelected bureaucrats or those in charge of important public 
goods, industries or services; business leaders who dominate local economies; 
prominent civil society actors, including those who head non-profit 
organizations within a community, local religious authorities, political activists 
or organizers and other respected community figures; members of traditional 
hierarchies with political and/or religious authority; leaders of non-state groups 
that have de facto authority in a certain area; or ranking military officers or 
their non-state counterparts. 
d. Everyday Actors: individual actors who lack any access to the various 
mechanisms of power, and indeed may be victims of oppression or 
marginalization by those who dominate these. Many of these may be members 
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of groups that are commonly disenfranchised based on socioeconomic status, 
racial/ethnic/tribal identity, political or religious affiliation, gender, sexuality, 
(perceived or actual) physical or mental ability and individual life history. 
Exclusion from power, however, is not simply a by-product of discrimination, 
as many others who fall outside of these categories are similarly without 
influence. This category is extremely diverse and is perhaps most appropriately 
conceptualized as involving any individual who cannot be considered a 
member of the three categories that preceded it. 
2. Methods: This study employs a broad definition of resistance that incorporates a 
diverse range of methods. The methods involved in resistance are fundamentally tied 
to both the actor(s) that is/are employing them and nature of power that is being 
resisted. Many of these involve employing the strategies or systems of power that are 
themselves being resisted, demonstrating the conceptual and practical 
interconnectedness of power and resistance that is essential to understanding both 
concepts. The categories outlined here incorporate a wide spectrum of actions, 
ranging from the employment of language to the threat or use of force, and 
commonly overlap with each other as many methods can be employed individually 
or collectively and undertaken in a direct or indirect way. A number of methods are 
often adopted together, both within and between categories. The typology of methods 
used in this study can be outlined as follows: 
a. Direct Collective Resistance: methods undertaken by groups that can be seen 
as public expressions of resistance. These include attempts to transform 
dominant discourses to accommodate the interests and experiences of either a 
marginalized group or the public as a whole; efforts to influence legislation or 
other government decision-making processes; the creation or maintenance of 
alternative political or social structures, systems and institutions; using popular 
movements, political organizations or civil society groups to challenge and 
attempt to change the existing order; public advocacy campaigns; the 
production and distribution of literature and politicized artistic or material 
products; strikes, protests, demonstrations, rallies, boycotts and petitions; land 
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seizures, redistribution efforts and the appropriation or occupation of property; 
rioting, looting and the destruction of property; and open revolution. 
b. Direct Individual Resistance: methods undertaken by individuals that are 
similarly overt. These include conscious transformations and assertions of self-
identity; activism, either as a participant or organizer; the public employment 
of counter-discourses, whether through verbal, written or artistic critique; and 
the use of violence, either independently or by forming or joining an armed 
group. 
c. Indirect Collective Resistance: methods undertaken by groups that are 
clandestine and covert, where the participants or even the acts themselves are 
intended to remain undetected. These include the use of counter-discourses, 
shared narratives, folk stories, songs, jokes, rumors, euphemisms and 
metaphors; the creation or protection of a culture based on the identity of the 
oppressed; organized obstructionism, subversion, workplace hindrance, theft, 
sabotage, vandalism; and carrying out acts of violence while concealing one’s 
identity, commonly in the form of guerilla activity or terrorism. 
d. Indirect Individual Resistance: methods undertaken by individuals that are 
similarly hidden and/or disguised. These include deception, mimicry, 
insincerity, feigned consent or ignorance, intentional negligence in one’s work; 
theft; acts of sabotage or vandalism; and acts of violence that are not intended 
to be public. 
3. Target(s) of Resistance: The target of resistance is power, either broadly conceived or 
in its specific manifestations, and the individuals, groups, institutions, structures and 
systems that uphold, legitimize, transmit or represent it. Acknowledging power in 
general terms and in its individual manifestations is important, as resistance can be 
directed at either an unjust system as a whole or its individual components. Indeed, 
distinguishing between these is often conceptually problematic, and they must be 
understood as conceptually inseparable. A typology of the targets of resistance is 
presented here, although it is important to note that these aspects of power may be 
difficult, or even impossible, to distinguish from each other, and the target of a 
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specific act of resistance may fall into many or even all of these categories. 
Nevertheless, these can be understood as: 
a. Political: governance, in all of its aspects, from exercising international 
influence and running the affairs of the state to regulating human behaviour.  
b. Social: the conventional norms and hierarchies that govern group organization. 
c. Economic: material domination, exploitation and inequalities. 
d. Cultural: the traditions, beliefs and practices that define a collective identity, 
and the material and artistic products that shape and are shaped by these. 
e. Coercive: the threat or use of force that upholds or enforces power.  
f. Discursive: the unproblematized systems of knowledge or discourses that 
justify and legitimize power. 
4. Structure and Agency: The interaction of structure and agency is a key variable in 
whether or not a certain action can be understood as a form of resistance. As the 
ability to direct and limit action is a defining element of power, an action that can 
otherwise be understood as a form of resistance must be understood in terms of 
power if the individual engaging in it is being forced to do so by external 
circumstances. Agency is necessary for resistance to occur. Without agency, 
resistance, regardless of any other factors, cannot be present. 
5. Intent: The issue of intent involves two separate considerations: whether or not the 
intent of a person’s actions, regardless of their consequences, can sufficiently 
constitute resistance, and whether or not the consequences of a person’s actions, 
regardless of their intent, can do the same. Agency is central in the case of the 
former, as a person’s conscious decision to resist must be assigned due significance 
independently of the success of any actions inspired by this decision. The role of 
agency in the latter, however, is more difficult to discern. This is primarily because 
of the fundamental complexity of the nature of intent. For example, actions that are 
commonly seen to fall into this category, such as theft or violence against an official, 
can be understood in two ways: in terms of their immediate benefits (or even non-
rational causes), that is, the procurement of stolen goods or preventing what is seen 
as an abuse of authority; and in terms of what can be seen as their broader targets, 
such as established systems of economic distribution or political oppression. This 
40 
 
second interpretation is especially significant for understanding resistance, as 
abstract concepts are commonly experienced in terms of these individual 
manifestations rather than as the sum of their parts, and are hence resisted as such. 
This is not to imply, of course, that all such actions can be understood in such a way, 
nor is it to justify those that can; instead, it is to acknowledge the complexities of 
understanding resistance as a phenomenon that is subject to the intricacies of human 
behaviour.  
 
As in most conceptual models, specificity has largely been sacrificed here as a 
means of maximizing breadth, flexibility and generalizability. This understanding of 
resistance is intended to be adaptable regardless of time or place; it will, and indeed 
should, emphasize different aspects of resistance in different contexts, and in some 
contexts a number of the actors, methods and targets that it identifies may be 
fundamentally different or even absent altogether. This is because resistance is itself a 
diverse, heterogeneous concept that has a wide variety of manifestations, and although the 
extent to which these manifestations are subject to change must be stressed, it is 
nevertheless possible to identify several commonalities that characterize resistance in its 
entirety. This is related to a more central epistemological consideration, which follows 
from the fact that as this study stresses the importance of context and contingency, as well 
as the centrality of subjective experience, in its analysis, it fundamentally questions the 
value of explanations that refer to universalized, depoliticized and dehistoricized 
theoretical frameworks. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that no act of resistance exists 
independently of these considerations, as each must necessarily be rooted in a particular set 
of circumstances from which it cannot be separated. This framework has been constructed 
in a way that adjusts to these circumstances without detaching an act of resistance from 
what identifies it with the concept of resistance more generally. It is therefore constructed 
in a way that is intended to avoid such epistemological dangers, and its ability to do so is 
central to its success. 
The remainder of this study will explore the themes discussed in this chapter in its 
analysis of the political economy of resistance in South Sudan. By addressing the ways in 
which resistance interacts with power outside of the spheres of post-conflict neoliberal 
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economic orthodoxy, it will test the strength of the conceptual framework presented here in 
terms of both flexible applicability and analytical capability. The informalized, 
criminalized and delegitimized economic spheres present in post-conflict South Sudan, it 
will be shown, can, and indeed must, be conceptualized in terms of the understanding of 
resistance presented in this paper. Recognizing this reality has important implications for 
that country’s peacebuilding and development projects that cannot be ignored for 
understanding post-conflict contexts more generally.   
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Chapter III: Neoliberalism and Informal Economies 
As resistance is such a diverse and heterogeneous concept, the complexity of its 
economic dimensions must be emphasized. Of central importance here is activity that takes 
place beyond the space defined and legitimized by neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and 
that is commonly labelled ‘informal’ as it is unregulated, untaxed and outside of the 
official legal structures of the state. Exactly how resistance becomes manifest in the 
informal economic sphere, however, deserves further scholarly analysis. A proper 
consideration of the key issues involved raises a number of important questions: is it 
possible to define a hegemonic discourse about economic growth in contemporary post-
conflict reconstruction projects? If so, what role is informal activity seen to play in post-
conflict environments and how, why and by whom is this defined and contested? And is 
involvement in informal economic activities a form of resistance?  
This chapter problematizes the neoliberal economic logic that defines dominant 
understandings of peacebuilding and development, both in South Sudan and in post-
conflict contexts more generally. Of particular importance is the role that informal 
economic activities play, and are seen to play, within neoliberal peacebuilding and 
development projects, along with how an unproblematized neoliberal logic masks complex 
dynamics of power and resistance. In analyzing these themes, this chapter critiques the 
reductionism inherent in neoliberal accounts of post-conflict reconstruction and argues that 
peacebuilding and development projects must incorporate approaches to the informal 
sector that adequately reflect and engage with their power and resistance dynamics, as 
doing so is essential for establishing a long-term peace that complements local economic 
realities while confronting their adverse effects.  
Neoliberalism is conceptualized as a form of power that dominates post-conflict 
environments. The relationship between resistance and informal economies, however, is 
more ambiguous. Participation in the informal sector can be understood as a form of 
resistance for those who elect to enter it as a means of resisting particular applications of 
power, specifically existing political, social and economic systems that are ineffective, 
unjust or exclusionary. Not all participation in the informal sector, however, can be 
understood in terms of resistance, particularly for those who do not enter it voluntarily. The 
informal sector therefore has a dual nature, as while it exists as a space in which 
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unfavourable economic realities can be contested, it is also a space of power that can 
replicate the abuses of neoliberalism. Informal economies, like their formal counterparts, 
are complex and heterogeneous, and must not be understood in universal terms. Their 
effects on peacebuilding and development are not essentially positive or negative; instead, 
the various actors, processes and relationships that constitute the informal sector must be 
considered in a way that is flexible and sensitive to context.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first outlines the 
neoliberal orthodoxy that characterizes contemporary approaches to peacebuilding and 
development. The extent to which peacebuilding and development have become 
conceptually linked, and to which economic liberalization has become a central aspect of 
each, is emphasized. It is argued that marketization has questionable benefits for post-
conflict environments and can indeed exacerbate many of the issues that it is intended to 
ameliorate.  
The second section conceptualizes informal economic activity, both in post-conflict 
contexts and more generally. Different theoretical approaches to the informal sector are 
explored as a means of unpacking the concept of informality in scholarly and policy 
literature. Of particular interest is the extent to which participation in the informal sector 
can be understood in terms of resistance. The dual nature of the informal sector as a space 
of power and a space of resistance is emphasized as a means of problematizing the 
neoliberal equation of informality with resistance. Participating in the informal sector can 
serve as a form of resistance to unsatisfactory economic conditions, but it must also be 
understood in terms of power where it reproduces the hierarchies and forms of exclusion 
inherent in neoliberalism. 
The third section explores the informal sector in South Sudan. It particularly 
highlights the limited local resonance of neoliberal economic orthodoxy. The conceptual 
model of resistance presented in the previous chapter is explored here as a means of 
demonstrating how the role of neoliberalism in the informal sector complicates attempts to 
identify the actors, methods and targets involved in resistance. The interaction of structure 
and agency, along with the issue of intent, are also emphasized as central to understanding 
informal economic activities as resistance.   
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i. Neoliberalism and the Economics of Peacebuilding 
Understanding power and resistance in the informal sector necessitates situating 
informal economic activities within the broader economic dimensions of post-conflict 
environments. Post-conflict situations should not be seen as ‘normal’ development 
contexts—insofar as ‘normal’ development contexts exist—as although they are defined by 
many of the problems that affect other underdeveloped spaces, a number of their primary 
characteristics are unique and must be regarded as such. State revenues are often low or 
non-existent, and are generally inadequate to meet actual or necessary expenditures. 
Macroeconomic shocks, including inflation and high interest rates, are commonplace, as 
are reduced levels of official foreign investment and trade. Conflict may have resulted in 
the large-scale destruction of personal and public assets, including infrastructure, disrupted 
value chains and limited access to credit and financial services. Levels of demand, output 
or employment are often reduced. Regulation is frequently absent, and accompanied by 
changes in property rights, land tenure and rule of law mechanisms. Finally, new forms of 
economic organization defined by strategies of accumulation, dispossession and 
distribution that reflect particular conflict realities regularly persist, complicating the return 
to pre-conflict ‘normalcy’. Factors that are ostensibly non-economic also shape post-
conflict economic realities. Pre-existing social and political structures, hierarchies and 
modes of organization often undergo dramatic transformations. The post-conflict state 
frequently enjoys low levels of legitimacy, stability or capacity, and has to contend with—
or even perpetuates—the threat or reality of continued violence, problems surrounding the 
reintegration of former combatants, low levels of public welfare, limited access to basic 
services and various educational, nutritional and other public health issues. The deep 
public divisions and antagonisms caused by conflict—along with the fragmentation or 
destruction of communities, problems with social cohesion and transformed group and 
personal relationships—are all commonly still present after the official end of hostilities.73  
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Contemporary peacebuilding and development initiatives commonly acknowledge 
and seek to address many of these issues. The United Nations (UN) explicitly highlights 
the relationship between peace and development in a number of its documents, and ties 
these to an extensive list of rights, reforms and norms that range from democracy and good 
governance to issues of public welfare, social justice and environmental sustainability. 
Local ownership, flexibility and adapting to specific contexts are all seen as essential to 
post-conflict reconstruction. The UN views private sector partnerships as a means of 
complementing its peacebuilding and development goals, emphasizing the ability of 
businesses to produce and provide necessary products and services, generate income and 
investment, create employment, develop human capacity, facilitate entrepreneurship, 
promote local enterprise and business linkages, establish and enforce commercial standards 
and practices, develop and transfer technologies, build physical and institutional 
infrastructure and undertake socially beneficial collective action.
74
  
The World Bank similarly focuses on the importance of economic growth in post-
conflict environments and the related issues of employment, security and justice as a 
means of escaping the ‘conflict trap’ of persistent poverty and recurrent conflict. Also like 
the UN, the World Bank advocates flexibility and context-specific approaches, 
demonstrating, it is sometimes argued, a movement beyond past efforts to promote 
neoliberal economic reforms in indebted countries through large-scale fiscal and monetary 
reform, privatization, deregulation and a limitation of the economic functions of the state 
in favour of the market. Despite these claims, however, the approaches to peacebuilding 
and development advocated by the World Bank must still be understood within a 
fundamentally market-oriented framework; although reforms address broader social issues 
and are designed to be sensitive to the various challenges presented by post-conflict 
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environments, they nevertheless centre on private sector-led growth that, along with other 
early programs and interventions designed to respond to extreme and immediate crises, is 
merely contextually adapted.
75
  
This faith in the potential of markets represents a more general consensus in 
peacebuilding and development communities. A broad range of policy documents—
including those authored by state agencies, policy institutes, NGOs and other civil society 
interest groups—similarly focus on the role of private sector development in post-conflict 
reconstruction. These documents commonly advocate the roles that local entrepreneurship, 
skills training, employment, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), access to financial 
services, market expansion, regional and international trade, the international investment 
climate, fiscal discipline and government policies that favour these can play in securing 
peace and economic growth. While some documents importantly state that the 
simultaneous pursuit of such reforms and peace may involve certain trade-offs that 
sacrifice marketization in favour of peacebuilding, the solutions that are advanced are still 
effectively market-based.
76
 Even academic literature tends to stress many of the same 
themes and approaches, as despite the existence of a considerable amount of critical 
scholarship that questions peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, economic 
liberalization is still widely regarded as a key component of post-conflict reconstruction.
77
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Two notable features of current approaches to post-conflict reconstruction thus 
deserve emphasis: first, that peacebuilding and development have come to be seen as 
fundamentally interconnected; and second, that the form of development that is meant to 
secure peace is universally understood within a neoliberal economic paradigm, with the 
‘free’ market ascribed a significant degree of benevolence and ability to address the 
underlying causes of conflict. What these two realities entail is not merely the 
securitization of development, but also the marketization of peace where peace becomes a 
product of the universal logic of the market, and is thus governed by—and indeed 
dependent upon—the supposedly neutral, benevolent and just interactions of capital, 
labour, the means of production and utility maximizing rational individuals governed by 
enlightened self-interest. Claims that a broad consensus surrounding a ‘liberal peace’ has 
emerged can thus be understood in political economy terms as well, as while it is possible 
to identify a certain degree of variation in the specific approaches and policy prescriptions 
that major actors advocate, existing debates largely take place within the dominant 
discourse rather than questioning the fundamental assumptions upon which the discourse 
itself is based. 
This liberal paradigm is highly problematic for a number of reasons. Marketization 
commonly threatens the establishment of peace as it can exacerbate existing tensions 
within a society while failing to improve, or even worsening, levels of poverty and 
inequality that contributed to the original outbreak of conflict.
78
 Indeed, market forces may 
have played an important role in the conflict itself, and emphasizing the importance of 
business interests, trade and entrepreneurship in post-conflict environments ignores the 
intricate ways in which each of these may have shaped and been shaped by conflict, giving 
them a peacebuilding role that is at best ambiguous.
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 The political economy of a specific 
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post-conflict situation is not a blank slate, and it must be considered in its proper historical, 
political and socioeconomic circumstances if peacebuilding and development projects are 
to achieve any degree of success. Even when the potential shortcomings of economic 
liberalization in post-conflict situations are acknowledged by scholars or practitioners, the 
common response is to alter the nature of market reforms rather than fundamentally 
question their supposed universal benefits. Neoliberal economic systems, structures and 
logics are seen as both natural and universally desirable; any problems are attributed to 
post-conflict societies that are being reformed rather than the prescriptions for reform 
themselves, with the assumption that a society may merely not be ‘ready’ to take 
advantage of the benefits of marketization without succumbing to its own pathologies.  
At a more conceptual level, framing development within the objectives of security 
can compromise development goals while raising questions about what and whom security 
and development are for. The equation of peace and liberalism involves a discursive 
separation of liberalism and violence, assigning liberalism a teleological universalism 
while othering violence as illegitimate, irrational and taking place entirely outside of 
physical and conceptual liberal space.
80
 This is highly problematic, as not only has conflict 
played an integral role in the emergence of liberal market economies,
81
 but it also ignores 
the role that liberalism plays in establishing and legitimizing the systems, structures, 
processes and discourses that normalize violence internationally.
82
 Furthermore, although a 
number of economic approaches to peacebuilding and development ostensibly eschew top-
down planning in favour of identifying and complementing local initiatives, they must be 
understood within the broader dynamics of global neoliberalism and its fundamental power 
relations. Producing liberal economic subjects, societies and discourses within a flawed 
international order that masks its own failings and injustices is central to initiatives from 
large-scale state privatizations to small-scale microfinance.
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Such inconsistencies, hierarchies and shortcomings must be recognized in any 
peacebuilding and development projects. The failure to do so would only undermine the 
success of viable post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
ii. Informal Economies 
It is within this neoliberal framework that the role of informal economies in post-
conflict reconstruction must be considered. Analyzing this, however, presents a number of 
notable difficulties, particularly because few studies have specifically addressed the nature 
of informal economies in post-conflict contexts or explored the implications they could 
have for peacebuilding and development. Where the importance of informal economies is 
highlighted in existing literature, it is often done so in a superficial and rather ambiguous 
way, as they are commonly seen as—often simultaneously—the undesirable consequences 
of the economic dimensions of conflict that must be engaged with in a way that 
reincorporates them into the formal sector; the economic spaces that are able to provide for 
basic needs when formal systems and structures break down; consisting of activities that 
involve, contrary to those that are formal and desirable, predation, exploitation and 
common linkages to illicit activity; harmful to growth due to their detrimental effects on 
formal competitiveness, the rule of law, government revenue and the social contract; and 
mutated versions of the private sector where entrepreneurship, ingenuity, efficiency and 
production are able to thrive, thus giving them significant potential to positively impact 
post-conflict reconstruction.
84
 Addressing the under-conceptualization of informal 
economies in post-conflict contexts requires engagement with the significant body of 
literature surrounding informal economies more generally. Doing so demonstrates the 
extent to which understandings of informal economies are commonly informed by a 
variety of discourses that often possess divergent theoretical underpinnings. Engagement 
with this literature also allows for neoliberal approaches to informal economic activities to 
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be explored and problematized, and for different assumptions about how power and 
resistance become manifest in the informal sector to be considered.  
Such an undertaking reveals a conceptual division of informal economies into four 
general categories of analysis.
85
 Traditional approaches, which constitute the first category, 
follow from how the informal sector was understood when it first emerged as a modern 
scholarly concept in the early 1970s. While neoclassical economics and modernization 
theory suggested that economically underdeveloped states would necessarily follow the 
same path to development as their wealthy capitalist equivalents, and that the ‘modern’ 
economies that emerged in the process would absorb the impoverished, unemployed 
masses that remained from the pre-capitalist period, the first studies to conceptualize the 
informal sector revealed the extent to which traditional approaches misunderstood its 
nature and underestimated its persistence. The concept that the industrialization of the 
formal sector would increase the demand for labour and thus minimize informal 
employment, however, was maintained, even as the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), which played an instrumental role in the original conceptualization of the informal 
sector, came to focus on the failures of market liberalization as a central aspect of the 
survival and growth of the informal sector.
86
 This approach generally considers the 
relationship between the informal and formal sectors to be dualistic, understanding the two 
as separate spheres with the informal economy able to provide for the basic needs of those 
who have been excluded from the formal economy.
87
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A second conceptual approach in the literature is neoliberal analysis of the informal 
sector, most importantly presented in Hernando de Soto’s The Other Path. Significantly, 
de Soto frames informal economic activities and the struggle to formalize them as a 
widespread form of resistance to the inefficient and exclusionary policies of an overly 
bureaucratic state. Through his analysis of informal economic activity in Peru—
specifically, informal housing, trade and urban transportation—de Soto claims that the 
failures of the country’s legal system, which reflect broader failures in governance, have 
caused mainly rational actors to weigh the respective costs of formality and informality 
and engage in the latter despite its undesirability. The economic effects of this, he argues, 
are significant, and include reduced productivity, lower investments, inefficient taxation, 
higher costs for basic utilities, low technological development and problems forming 
macroeconomic policy. De Soto thus claims that the solution to the problems he outlines, 
and indeed the main desire of those who operate in the informal sector, is reforming the 
legal system in a way that reduces the costs of formality and facilitates entry into the 
formal economy for those who are commonly excluded from it. Such changes, de Soto 
suggests, would significantly improve economic performance and efficiency, as they 
would allow people to benefit from the ‘good laws’ that provide protections for property 
rights, contracts and extracontractual liabilities.
88
 The concept that informal economies are 
sites of creativity and entrepreneurship that must be incorporated into formal markets has 
since been adopted by major development actors, including the IMF and the World Bank, 
and entered popular and policy discourse.
89
  
The two remaining categories of literature provide valuable insights into the 
shortcomings of neoliberal analyses of informal economic activity. Structuralist 
approaches, which constitute the third body of literature, frame the informal economy 
within the subordination of labour by capital that has historically characterized capitalist 
development. Structuralism stresses that market-based globalization both produces 
informality and depends on it to function. In contrast to dualistic and legalistic 
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interpretations of the relationship between the formal and informal economies, structuralist 
approaches acknowledge the extent to which the informal sphere exists in a subordinate 
role to its formal counterpart, and contextualize both within the broader contours of the 
global economic system.
90
  
The final body of literature emphasizes the importance of the social networks that 
shape informal economies, highlighting a number of factors that are commonly ignored in 
traditional economic analysis, including personal relationships, ethnicity, religion, gender 
and class. The concept of social capital is central here, as trust, group cohesion and shared 
values play significant roles in defining and regulating informal economic activities.
91
 
Economic actors are thus reframed as contextualized subjective individuals whose actions 
are shaped by specific circumstances and identities. This represents a notable departure 
from the objectivization of homo oeconomicus as the ahistorical, apolitical, asocial and 
entirely rational actor that exists in standard economic theory, and undermines the belief 
that it is possible to identify immutable universal truths about human behaviour. 
All four conceptual categories have their limitations. Much of the theoretical and 
empirical work that exists on informal economies specifically addresses the informal sector 
in Latin America, and the appropriateness of decontextualizing and dehistoricizing existing 
studies as a means of providing insights into the entirety of Sub-Saharan Africa must be 
questioned.
92
 Furthermore, none of the conceptual categories sufficiently problematizes the 
‘informal economy’ concept itself, which highlights additional shortcomings. First, there is 
a significant danger in analyzing the informal economy as a homogeneous entity when the 
term itself encapsulates a wide variety of economic activities and actors. Failing to 
differentiate between, for example, street traders, domestic workers and casual labourers, 
as well as informal employers, the self-employed and employees, is conceptually 
problematic. Second, while much of the literature on informal economies understands 
engagement in informal activities in terms of desperation or, alternatively, the opportunity 
cost calculations of rational economic actors, the reality is much more complex as 
individuals either choose to enter or are forced into informal work for a variety of reasons 
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depending on individual circumstance.
93
 Finally, even analysis that recognizes the 
shortcomings of dominant approaches to the informal sector is often inadequate. Referring 
to ‘informality’ as a unique phenomenon establishes a false dichotomy that ignores 
‘formal’/‘informal’ linkages and interdependencies as well as the way these relate to larger 
regional or global commodity chains, trade and investment systems and liberalization 
programs.
94
  
Furthermore, none of the four conceptual approaches to informal economies 
specifically addresses post-conflict contexts. As post-conflict situations should not be seen 
as ‘normal’ economic environments, the issue of what roles the informal sector can play in 
them must be explored. The relationship between informal economic activities and 
peacebuilding and development is of particular importance. Such an analysis must 
emphasize context, nuance and diversity, and must constantly problematize existing 
assumptions in order to critically engage with their limitations while providing space for 
existing alternatives.  
Employing a framework of resistance to conceptualize informal economic activities 
can help to remedy several of these shortcomings. It is particularly useful for highlighting 
three points that are neglected in the existing literature: that both power and resistance are 
present in the informal sector, that the informal sector is fundamentally tied to the 
neoliberal global economic system and that the absence of the hierarchies and inequalities 
that define neoliberalism is a necessary condition for understanding informal economic 
activity as an entirely resistant phenomenon. 
The neoliberal view that participation in the informal sector represents a form of 
resistance to the misuse of state power by rational actors is especially relevant here. On 
closer analysis the neoliberal understanding of informal economic activity as resistance is 
inadequate as both power and resistance are present in the informal sector and influence 
participation within it. It is indeed true that many individuals may make the conscious 
decision to subvert the laws of the state by undertaking unregulated, extralegal economic 
activity. It is also necessary, however, to account for those who are forced into the informal 
sector because they lack alternatives to meet their basic needs. For these people, the 
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informal sector can represent a sphere of power rather than a sphere of resistance, where 
action is constrained by a socioeconomic system in which they are marginalized and 
without the protections, however limited, afforded by formal employment. Informal 
economies therefore have a dual nature: while some actors undertake indirect individual 
resistance against what they regard as an unjust and exclusionary political or 
socioeconomic system, informal economies represent, for others, extensions of this 
injustice and exclusion. Those who are forced into informal economic activities can still 
undertake acts of individual or collective resistance, but their participation in the informal 
sector should not be understood as resistance in itself. This ambiguity has important 
ramifications, as it demonstrates the extent to which power and resistance are relative and 
fluid concepts, and how they can be mutually present in the same phenomena. Like their 
formal counterparts, informal economies possess their own dynamics of power and 
resistance. Using either power or resistance to understand informal economies as a whole 
is misguided, and theories that attempt to do so must be rejected. 
Power and resistance are similarly ambiguous when one considers the question of 
international linkages. Here, the relationship between neoliberalism and informal 
economies is one of simultaneous incorporation and exclusion; while the informal sector 
must be understood within the broader contours of the global economy and its ideational 
underpinnings, and particularly the processes through which certain spaces or people 
benefit or are disenfranchised, the same neoliberal orthodoxy that underwrites this system 
is presented as a solution to its negative effects. Informal economies do not exist separately 
from the global economic system; they are a fundamental part of it, and the idea that they 
can be incorporated into the formal sphere ignores their existing subordinate relationship to 
it. It is therefore possible to identify a key feature of power and resistance in the informal 
sector: neoliberalism—insofar as it shapes the global economic system and the hierarchies 
and forms of exclusion of define it—can be understood as defining the form of power that 
is being resisted by informal economic activity and, for many of those who participate in 
the informal sector to overcome unfavourable economic conditions, the method employed 
to resist the effects of this power. Resistance may involve adopting or co-opting a form of 
neoliberalism for local purposes, or seeking to alter the way in which a specific area is 
integrated into the global economy rather than challenging the nature of the global 
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economy itself. Adopting neoliberalism as a form of resistance also involves replicating 
the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism, specifically the hierarchies and 
distributional disparities that it entails, but it constitutes resistance nonetheless.  
When actors are able to resist political and socioeconomic exclusion without 
replicating the economic arrangements that perpetuate them, however, their actions cannot 
be understood in terms of neoliberalism. Informal economic activities are not inherently a 
form of local neoliberalism, and it is possible to voluntary engage in them without 
enforcing hierarchies or perpetuating exclusion. Informal economic activities that are 
inclusive, co-operative, broad-based, popularly owned and sensitive to the needs and 
desires of the community resist both unsatisfactory economic realities and the neoliberal 
orthodoxy that defines peacebuilding and development. These activities can be quite 
diverse; what unites them is their fundamental lack of the power dynamics that define 
neoliberalism.  
What is important to emphasize, therefore, is that the dynamics of power and 
resistance in informal economic activities are complex, variant and ambiguous, and that 
they cannot be divorced from their contextual specificities to be considered in universal 
terms. The remainder of this chapter will explore how power and resistance shape the 
informal sector in post-conflict South Sudan. The neoliberal orthodoxy that dominates the 
country’s peacebuilding and development projects, it will be argued, has limited local 
resonance. Participation in the informal sector can, in some instances, be understood in 
terms of resistance. Nevertheless, neoliberal approaches to informal economic activity 
must ultimately be rejected in favour of a view that more accurately reflects the power and 
resistance dynamics that shape the informal sector.  
 
iii. Neoliberalism, Informal Economies and Resistance in South Sudan 
A broad consensus has emerged amongst international and powerful domestic 
actors regarding the centrality of private sector-led growth in South Sudan’s peacebuilding 
and development programs. Major international actors involved in post-conflict South 
Sudan—including, amongst others, the UN, the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank (AfDB)—explicitly highlight the relationship between inclusive economic growth 
and the establishment of peace. A number of objectives are commonly identified in this 
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regard: private sector development (PSD) that is particularly focused on promoting 
entrepreneurship and SMEs; the availability of productive and decent formal employment; 
fiscal ‘responsibility’ in the form of reducing expenditures—especially those on 
government salaries and operating costs—and increasing revenues to enhance 
macroeconomic stability; building physical and institutional infrastructure, including laws 
and regulations that are conducive to a business environment that coheres with 
international standards; improving access to credit and markets for buying and selling 
goods; and undertaking policies that specifically target women, youth, the poor or ex-
combatants and attempt to improve their socioeconomic wellbeing. South Sudan, it is often 
claimed, possesses significant potential for growth led by a diverse and competitive private 
sector, particularly one that can take advantage of the country’s natural resource wealth, 
agricultural capacity and large labour force that is not engaged in formal economic activity. 
This logic is central to the peace/development nexus promoted by the international 
community, and is adopted virtually without question.
95
  
The government of South Sudan (GoSS) similarly claims to focus on peace through 
development with broad-based economic growth that maximizes poverty reduction and 
improves a wide variety of non-economic development indicators. In doing so, it endorses 
a similar conception of the state and its relationship with the private sector, envisioning the 
state’s economic role as limited to creating an ‘enabling environment’ for businesses by 
providing and maintaining peace and security, the rule of law, macroeconomic stability, 
effective and efficient regulation and essential infrastructure. The government’s market-
based strategy also involves encouraging investment—particularly FDI—and removing 
what the government has identified as the three primary constraints to growth: a lack of 
security, poor physical infrastructure for transportation and multiple taxation systems. State 
intervention in the economy is rejected in favour of market-based initiatives that have been 
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“proven to work”, and beyond providing a limited number of public goods to improve 
market function, the GoSS regards its economic role as minimal.
96
  
Neoliberalism therefore dominates international and national approaches to the 
political economy of post-conflict South Sudan. This dominance also affects 
understandings of the country’s informal sector. Although reliable statistics do not exist, it 
is generally acknowledged that the vast majority of economic activity in South Sudan can 
be classified as informal; the World Bank estimates that 80% of all workers in South 
Sudan, including up to 80% of SMEs, operate in the informal sector,
97
 and the AfDB 
claims that only 10% of the country’s population has formal employment.98 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that informal economic activity has increased since the end of the 
conflict, particularly in urban areas—such as Juba, the capital—that have absorbed large-
scale migration.
99
 Despite the size and importance of the informal sector in South Sudan, 
however, major documents by both international organizations and the GoSS itself 
commonly fail to acknowledge even the existence of the informal economy, let alone 
consider its importance for peacebuilding and development.
100
 When informality is 
recognized, it is often in strictly rural terms: the AfDB and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), for example, refer to the importance of establishing 
markets—particularly for agricultural goods—seemingly ex nihilo,101 while popular 
analysis often suggests that the “ancient barter economy” in the country’s rural areas 
prevented a humanitarian disaster when the GoSS shut down oil production from January 
2012 to April 2013 in a dispute with the Republic of Sudan.
102
 The UN only mentions the 
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growth of parallel food markets as a “major concern” that leads to inflation and food 
shortages.
103
  
The work of the World Bank, however, represents a notable departure from this 
widespread silence about informality, and thus dominates the literature on informal 
economic activity in post-conflict South Sudan. Importantly, the World Bank highlights 
the dual nature of the informal sector as detrimental to economic efficiency, growth and 
workers’ rights, and, simultaneously, as possessing the potential to provide alternative 
post-conflict livelihoods that should be harnessed as a driving force for development. 
Central to this duality is the notion that informal businesses are excluded from the benefits 
of formality due to poorly designed, overly complex and burdensome regulation that 
imposes unmanageably high costs and effectively limits locally driven economic 
growth.
104
 Reforming the country’s legal system, reducing taxes and fees, limiting 
regulation and reducing the economic role of the state are therefore seen as the key to 
encouraging involvement in the formal economy while reducing informal activities.
105
 
Framing the informal sector in such a way, the World Bank effectively adopts a neoliberal 
approach to informal economic activities, suggesting that they are, following de Soto, 
dynamic, creative and rational responses to economically damaging state intervention, and 
while they may have negative effects in their existing form, these can be addressed through 
formalization. The World Bank assigns primacy to the informal sector in South Sudan’s 
market-based peacebuilding/development nexus, and frames that sector in terms of a 
resistant yet flawed and incomplete local neoliberalism. With South Sudan’s informal 
sector generally neglected and under-theorized elsewhere, the World Bank’s dominant 
view remains, at least amongst major international actors, largely uncontested.  
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Importantly, however, the local hegemony of the World Bank’s neoliberal 
orthodoxy is much more limited, and commonly disconnected from popular opinion. 
Although information on public opinion in South Sudan is scarce, existing studies indicate 
that a large portion of the country’s population believes that the government should play a 
much more significant economic role than both international actors and the GoSS itself 
suggest. Stable and decent employment is a primary concern for much of the country’s 
population, a large number of whom believe that the public sector should be the first 
source of employment for citizens who desire jobs. Indeed, many support a significant 
expansion of public sector administration and expenditures as a means of guaranteeing 
basic livelihoods and fulfilling a democratic social contract. Even in agricultural work, 
which is widely considered to be the main alternative to government employment, 
government intervention is still seen as essential for promoting self-reliance. While the role 
that private businesses and the informal sector can play in the pursuit of broader 
development goals is commonly acknowledged, these are seen as supplying limited 
employment and having a more minor economic role than neoliberal orthodoxy 
suggests.
106
 Some also complain that the informal sector is, like its formal counterpart, 
largely dominated by foreigners rather than the South Sudanese themselves, suggesting 
that it represents a sphere of marginalization and powerlessness rather than economic 
opportunity.
107
 While negative views of neoliberalism and the informal sector are by no 
means universal,
108
 what is essential here is the extent to which neoliberal orthodoxy lacks 
the same hegemony at the local level that it possesses both nationally and internationally. 
The desires of the public, while diverse, commonly diverge from the realities and 
objectives of South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development projects, as reflected in the 
growing disillusionment with the government’s development strategy and the increasingly 
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widespread sense that the country’s post-conflict economic growth has been inadequate 
and unequal.
109
 
Neoliberal understandings of informal economies in South Sudan suffer from a 
number of other flaws. Informal agricultural or pastoral activity is highly tied to meeting 
basic needs and cannot be understood in the same terms as urban informal enterprises, as 
although such activities do indeed involve their own forms of production and exchange 
that are often disconnected from the formal sector, they do not represent a similar response 
to overly burdensome government regulation.
110
 While certain urban informal activities 
can be quite profitable by national standards,
111
 they must also be considered in relation to 
the problems outlined for informal economic activities more generally, including the 
barriers to entry and competition based on dominant social networks and access to capital; 
the role that hierarchies and inequalities play in influencing and shaping participation in 
informal activities; and the national and global structural problems that contribute to 
informality by perpetuating socioeconomic exclusion. Existing peacebuilding and 
development programs exacerbate these problems, not only because much of South 
Sudan’s formal sector is dominated by foreign businesses—particularly from Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia—who serve the needs of the international community in urban 
centres and do not reinvest their profits in South Sudan,
112
 but also because advancing 
policies based on an unproblematized understanding of informal economic activities tends 
to portray further economic liberalization as a panacea when it is anything but.  
Neoliberalism thus provides an inadequate theoretical framework for understanding 
the informal sector in South Sudan. This conclusion has important implications for 
conceptualizing informal economic activity in the country in terms of power and 
resistance. Following the framework of resistance employed in this study, three important 
points deserve particular emphasis: the role of neoliberalism in the informal sector, the 
interaction of structure and agency and the question of intent.  
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First, the role that neoliberalism plays in informal economic activities means that 
the actors, methods and targets involved in resistance in this regard cannot be easily 
defined. This is primarily because neoliberalism can simultaneously constitute power and 
resistance in the informal sector. Power at the international and national levels can be 
understood in terms of a hegemonic, unproblematized neoliberal economic orthodoxy that 
simultaneously others informality—thereby denying its own relation to it—and 
understands it as an incomplete local form of neoliberalism that must be incorporated into 
the global economic system. The externalization of the informal sector as a quasi-liberal 
space and its governance and normalization through the local reproduction of 
neoliberalism is a central aspect of the governmentality and biopower that defines 
reconstruction efforts more generally. According to neoliberal logic, those who participate 
in informal activities have aspirations that cohere with the structures and norms of the 
global economic system, and thus resist anything—namely, the state—that deviates from 
the universal logics of benign economic rationalism. As this chapter has suggested, 
however, the neoliberal understanding of informal economic activity as resistance is highly 
problematic, particularly given the broader structural realities that shape and define the 
informal sector. Claims that a form of local neoliberalism can constitute resistance must 
recognize that neoliberalism has its own inherent forms of domination and exclusion.  
In instances where participation in the informal sector can be understood in terms 
of resistance there is therefore a tension between neoliberalism as economic orthodoxy and 
neoliberalism as a response to the inadequacies of the current economic system. The reality 
that neoliberalism can constitute both power and resistance is best understood in terms of 
postcolonial mimicry and local/liberal hybridity: local actors are able to adopt, co-opt and 
even reshape external models for their own purposes, and when they do so with a form of 
power such as neoliberalism, it constitutes resistance even if oppressive and exclusionary 
power structures are reproduced. If an individual undertakes resistance by reproducing 
neoliberalism, however, he or she is simultaneously engaging in a form of power that may 
constrain the actions of others. Specifically, by participating in the informal sector in a way 
that adopts or enforces the abuses of neoliberalism, an individual becomes involved in a 
space of power that can limit the agency and socioeconomic wellbeing of those who are 
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forced into it by broader structural factors. What serves as a form of resistance for one 
person may therefore act as a form of power for another.   
Informal economic activities that do not reproduce these power structures, 
conversely, can be understood in terms of a Polanyian double movement that seeks to 
restore the social embeddedness of the market that economic liberalization disrupts. 
Separating resistant informal activities from those that replicate neoliberal power 
dynamics, however, is conceptually difficult, and again, universal claims about informal 
activities must be avoided. The complex power and resistance dynamics that define 
informal economies must be emphasized; neither power nor resistance is sufficient for 
conceptualizing the informal sector on its own, and should not be considered as such.   
The second point relates to the interaction of structure and agency, and specifically 
the tension between understanding the informal sector as a space in which people are 
forced into due to external circumstances and understanding it as a space that people 
voluntarily enter in pursuit of a specific goal that undermines, contradicts or conflicts with 
power. These two understandings, however, should not be seen as mutually exclusive; 
indeed, the duality of power and resistance that they represent is a key quality of the 
informal sector. While some individuals may choose to participate in informal economic 
activities as a means of resistance, others may be forced into doing so as a result of 
external circumstances. The informal sector as a whole thus cannot be understood in terms 
of resistance, as the absence of agency and the limitation of an individual’s scope of action 
more accurately represents a form of power that forces those without viable alternatives to 
engage in informal economic activities. Agency is the central variable for understanding 
participation in the informal sector as resistance. Where agency is present, so is resistance. 
Where agency is limited, resistance is as well. Although, as Scott suggests, certain forms of 
resistance are possible even when action is severely limited by power, participation in the 
informal sector itself, in this regard, cannot be understood in terms of resistance.  
The interaction of structure and agency is related to the third point, which 
surrounds the question of intent; namely, whether or not an individual’s actions or 
decisions can be understood in terms of resistance even if they were not conceived as such, 
or, more specifically, whether or not all participation in resistant informal activity can be 
understood as resistance regardless of individual intent. As the framework employed in this 
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study emphasizes the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing between the 
immediate targets of an action and the larger structures, systems or realities that they 
represent, the very act of voluntarily participating in informal activities must be understood 
in the context of resisting the broader socioeconomic injustices or forms of exclusion that 
make informal activities viable or preferable to formal alternatives. Again, the presence of 
agency is central here, as where participation in informal activities is governed by power-
based structural factors rather than conscious decision-making, resistance cannot be said to 
be present.    
Contemporary approaches to peacebuilding and development must be reconsidered 
given such an understanding of the dynamics of power and resistance in informal 
economic activities. As argued above, the merging of peacebuilding and development in 
post-conflict environments, and the marketization of the peacebuilding/development nexus 
that this entails, leaves assumed relationships between peace, ‘free’ markets and liberalism 
more generally unproblematized, and thus has significant practical and conceptual flaws. 
Informal economic activities must be considered within this context, and the power and 
resistance dynamics that define them must be properly understood. As the political 
economy of South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development processes demonstrates, the 
failure to properly engage with the complexities of informal economic activities and 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy as a whole can result in a post-conflict economic program 
that is disconnected from the heterogeneous desires of, and realities experienced by, the 
local population.  
 
iv. Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted the power and resistance dynamics that characterize 
informal economies, both in South Sudan and more generally. The role that neoliberalism 
plays in defining the dual nature of the informal sector as a space of power and resistance 
has been emphasized, suggesting that neoliberal understandings of informal economic 
activity are inadequate. Like its formal counterpart, the informal sector is an internally 
diverse and heterogeneous sphere containing a wide variety of actors, activities, logics, 
strategies and relationships; power and resistance permeate every aspect of informal 
activities, but each, on its own, is insufficient for understanding the informal sector as a 
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whole. Neoliberal approaches that seek to simultaneously externalize and incorporate the 
informal sector into a broader attempt to restructure post-conflict states and societies in 
coherence with neoliberal orthodoxy deny their own problematic forms of power and their 
inherent forms of domination, exploitation and exclusion. Resistance, as suggested by the 
framework employed in this study, can exist in a wide variety of forms, encompassing a 
diverse set of actors, methods, targets and rationales. It is only when the hierarchies and 
forms of exclusion inherent in neoliberalism are absent—and agency is present—that it 
becomes possible to understand informal economic activities exclusively in terms of 
resistance.  
These power/resistance dynamics have significant implications for understanding 
contemporary peacebuilding and development projects in South Sudan. The neoliberal 
orthodoxy that dominates the country’s post-conflict economic realities at both the 
international and national levels has limited local resonance, and championing informal 
economies as a form of local neoliberalism that, when formalized, can play a central role in 
market-driven growth replicates many of the problems that characterize neoliberalism in 
post-conflict contexts more generally. A more appropriate approach to South Sudan’s post-
conflict political economy must respond to local economic realities in a way that is 
sensitive to the various interactions of power and resistance that define them. Contextually 
relevant methods of supporting economic structures, systems and modes of production, 
organization and exchange must be formulated, and should be evaluated based on whether 
or not they are inclusive, broad-based and popularly owned; minimize existing or potential 
power hierarchies and inequalities; and respond to the needs and desires of local 
populations, giving primacy to these over the interests of international and national actors. 
Informal economic activities, to the extent that they cohere with the objective of promoting 
inclusive, equal and responsive local political economies, should be encouraged; where 
they fail to complement such an objective, conversely, they should be engaged with in a 
way that minimizes their negative effects while maximizing their positive ones. Such a 
strategy possesses the virtue of taking the power and resistance dynamics that characterize 
individual informal activities, organizations and relationships into account, and thus, for 
the reasons explored in this chapter, represents a viable approach to the political economy 
of peacebuilding and development. 
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Chapter IV: Legitimacy and Legality  
Informal economic activity, although viewed as less desirable than its formal 
counterpart, is often seen as potentially coherent with the logics and processes of 
neoliberalism. Other activities, conversely, are delegitimized, criminalized and 
externalized, and cast as irregular, unjust and undesirable strategies of accumulation and 
distribution. The political economy of post-conflict spaces is thus often conceptualized in 
terms of the twin dichotomies of legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit economic activity, 
with the former in each emphasized as central to the success of peacebuilding and 
development initiatives and the latter seen as detrimental to such an objective.   
These divisions, however, deserve to be problematized, and also conceptualized in 
terms of power and resistance. Doing so raises a number of important questions: what 
logics can be seen to define criminalized and delegitimized activities, and how are these 
related to both neoliberalism and global economic realities? Does participating in 
criminalized and delegitimized activities constitute resistance? And how are 
legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies conceptualized, debated and addressed 
in South Sudan? This chapter will explore dominant understandings of economic legality 
and legitimacy within the context of power and resistance, highlighting the tensions, 
inconsistencies and instabilities that characterize common legitimate/illegitimate and 
licit/illicit dichotomies while analyzing the logics that govern the political economy of 
post-conflict environments. In doing so, it will demonstrate that understandings of 
legitimacy and legality are commonly contested, and should not be seen as neutral or 
apolitical. They are also frequently incompatible with each other, as many actions, 
practices and modes of distribution and exchange that are illegal may be seen by some as 
legitimate, whereas, conversely, many that are seen by some as illegitimate may 
nevertheless be legal.  
This chapter specifically explores debates surrounding corruption and land tenure 
in South Sudan as a means of considering how the logics, processes and actions that define 
economic legality and legitimacy are resisted. Corruption is analyzed as an example of 
economic activity that is commonly understood as illegal and illegitimate, but that is 
nevertheless widely engaged in. Issues surrounding land tenure are conversely analyzed as 
a means of exploring how economic activities that are seen as legal and legitimate in 
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neoliberal orthodoxy may have detrimental effects that inspire local resistance. 
Conceptualizing contestations of legitimacy and legality in terms of power and resistance 
allows for an appropriate understanding of the hierarchies and forms of domination that are 
commonly neglected by legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies, along with the 
various ways in which these are countered and transformed. Such an undertaking can 
provide valuable insights into the political economy of post-conflict South Sudan, and 
should thus be central to any peacebuilding and development projects in the country. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first explores the 
issue of corruption in South Sudan. Central here is the question of whether or not 
participating in illicit economic activities can be seen as a form of resistance, specifically 
to flawed or inadequate legal activities. The implications that the relationship between 
poverty and supposedly deviant behaviour has for understanding resistance is particularly 
highlighted. This chapter seeks to move beyond narratives that frame corruption as either 
the antithesis of neoliberalism or as enjoying local legitimacy as an alternative to foreign 
legal and normative arrangements. It therefore also explores the logics of illicit and illegal 
economic activities and demonstrates the extent to which these are tied to the neoliberal 
orthodoxy that informs peacebuilding and development.  
The second section focuses on debates surrounding land tenure. A number of deals 
in which land in South Sudan has been acquired by foreign firms or investors are analyzed 
in order to explore how and why local communities engage in resistance. The various roles 
that different actors can play in resistance are outlined in order to complicate the overly 
simplistic equation of power with international actors and resistance with local actors. 
Examining existing debates about economic activity in South Sudan in terms of power and 
resistance is essential for understanding how, by whom and for what purposes the concepts 
of legality and legitimacy are defined and contested in post-conflict spaces.  
 
i. Corruption 
Issues of legitimacy and legality are of central importance to the political economy 
of post-conflict South Sudan. Much of this becomes manifest in debates about what is 
commonly referred to as ‘corruption’, often conceptualized broadly to include any 
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economic activities that can be viewed as illegitimate and/or illegal.
113
 Corruption is 
widely identified as a significant threat to the country’s political and economic viability, 
with a number of international organizations, domestic leaders and everyday actors 
stressing the importance of combating corruption through a variety of means.
114
 This view 
of corruption largely coheres with peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, in which 
criminalized and delegitimized activities are commonly seen as harmful for several 
reasons: because they undermine state-building, institutional strength, the rule of law and 
the establishment of a social contract based on trust and legitimacy; because they deplete 
the (often already limited) resources of the state and the formal economy; because they 
benefit ‘spoilers’ whose economic or political interests may conflict with the establishment 
of peace; and because, most fundamentally, they ostensibly violate and undermine the 
foundations of democratic governance and market-based economics, both of which are 
seen as central to the establishment of peace and economic growth.
115
 
South Sudan has experienced a number of prominent corruption scandals since the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, including the ‘dura saga’ 
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in which over US $2 billion was lost in a plan to construct grain stores around the 
country,
116
 and government audits that suggest questionable financial practices, 
unauthorized expenditures, payroll irregularities, dubious contracts, accounting errors and 
money that is simply unaccounted for.
117
 A total of US $4 billion of public money has been 
stolen by corrupt officials since 2005, roughly equivalent to one third of the total value of 
oil receipts—which account for 98% of government revenue—between the signing of the 
CPA and independence in 2011.
118
 Although the GoSS has undertaken steps to eliminate 
corruption, its efforts are often seen as inadequate or insincere. President Salva Kiir 
Mayardit’s offer of amnesty to 75 officials suspected of theft was criticized by some as 
ineffective and unjust.
119
 The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC), 
established by the Interim Constitution in 2005, is frequently seen as too impotent to 
combat corruption, and the Ministry of Justice is similarly criticized for failing to prosecute 
corrupt officials based on the evidence provided by the SSACC.
120
 These shortcomings 
were exacerbated in 2013 as the budget of the SSACC was reduced by almost 40% despite 
claims from its members that such a move would significantly undermine the ability of the 
organization to pursue its mandate.
121
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Understanding corruption in South Sudan in terms of power and resistance raises 
two key issues. First, it is important to consider whether or not participation in corruption 
constitutes a form of resistance. Following the framework of resistance employed in this 
study, it is possible to understand such actions as indirect collective resistance in cases 
where the beneficiary is a specific group, including, for example, the favourable allocation 
of public funds for patronage purposes or the obtainment of a market advantage due to 
political connections. Alternatively, participation in corruption can serve as a form of 
indirect individual resistance when the parties involved have purely personal interests, 
including the theft of public funds by an official for personal enrichment or the use of a 
family connection to secure employment. Corruption can involve a wide variety of 
international, national, community and everyday actors, including foreign firms and 
investors, government officials, business leaders and the clients who benefit from systems 
of patronage. The target of resistance is an economic status quo that is, from the 
perspective of the participant, in some way unsatisfactory, as well as the normative and 
legal structures that uphold it.  
As with the informal sphere, however, conceptualizing all participation corruption 
as resistance is too simplistic, specifically because it ignores the power dynamics that can 
govern such activities. These power dynamics are related to the complex interactions of 
structure and agency, particularly the reality that some individuals are forced into what are 
seen as illegitimate or illegal activities by poverty or a lack of alternatives for guaranteeing 
or advancing their socioeconomic status. Indeed, even those in South Sudan who claim that 
corruption is harmful to development and broader national interests commonly suggest that 
it is a response to poverty, as those who engage in it lack other forms of access to power or 
any realistic means of improving their socioeconomic situations.
122
 In these instances, 
participation in corruption is more accurately understood as the effect of a form of power 
that is economically hierarchical and exclusionary. In many cases, the processes, 
relationships and activities can be equally characterized by hierarchical power 
arrangements that, while possibly providing certain benefits, are not conducive to 
emancipation.  
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The presence of power undermines the potential of theorizing corruption in terms 
of Gramscian counter-hegemony or a Polanyian double movement, and again highlights 
the importance of understanding how power and resistance become manifest in specific 
contexts rather than in universal terms. The individual interactions of structure and agency 
are also necessary for identifying intent, as while it may be difficult, or even impossible, to 
separate resistance to a particular socioeconomic reality from resistance to the broader 
systems and structures that such a reality represents, intent cannot be said to be present 
where agency is limited.  
The second issue that is relevant for understanding corruption in South Sudan in 
terms of power and resistance concerns the concept that such activities possess a form of 
local legitimacy outside of the boundaries of neoliberalism. The notion that corruption is 
both harmful and undesirable enjoys a broad consensus amongst a variety of international, 
national, community and everyday actors, although there is a noticeable disconnect 
between such an opinion and the reality that corruption is, by all accounts, endemic in 
South Sudan. Thus, while corruption in itself may not be considered legitimate in public 
discourse, corrupt activities and arrangements are still common in private practice. Again, 
the significance of structural factors, specifically poverty, must be emphasized here as key 
to any explanation of the causes and perpetuation of corruption.  
It is also important to refrain from equating corruption with a resistant local 
political economy that exists independently of neoliberalism. Indeed, corruption—like 
criminalized, delegitimized economic activities more generally—is fundamentally tied to 
the logics and processes of neoliberalism and plays an ambiguous role in peacebuilding 
and development. In some instances, corruption can promote peacebuilding and 
development by providing a key incentive for cooperation and stability.
123
 Concepts such 
as corruption lack universality while norms and understandings of legitimacy are 
commonly contested in post-conflict environments, emphasizing the importance of 
rejecting dehistoricized, depoliticized legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit dichotomies in 
favour of flexible, context-specific approaches that negotiate the unique political and 
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economic dynamics of a post-conflict situation and adapt to existing realities in a way that 
seeks to preserve peace and economic stability.
124
  
Additionally, peacebuilding and development can similarly promote economic 
arrangements that their own neoliberal logics render illicit and illegitimate. Economic and 
political liberalization can facilitate corruption through power-sharing agreements that 
distribute political power, influence and state assets, along with democratic transitions that 
may involve the allocation of resources to guarantee support; through the privatization of 
state assets and the promotion of open access to markets, both of which can be manipulated 
for political and economic gain and can also favour those who have engaged in activities 
that are otherwise seen as illicit or illegitimate; and through rent-seeking surrounding the 
distribution of donor funds.
125
 Peacebuilding can thus establish or enforce an environment 
in which corruption is normalized, institutionalized and rationalized through logical 
political or economic calculations.
126
 Beyond peacebuilding and development, recent 
economic liberalization efforts have played a central role in promoting the development of 
a criminalized political economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, as actors are able to manipulate 
the reduction of the size of the state, the privatization of state assets and access to foreign 
aid, capital and (licit or illicit) markets for personal political power or economic gain.
127
 
Corruption, like other criminalized, delegitimized economic activities, therefore not only 
possesses its own logics and functions, but is also intricately connected to liberalization 
itself.
128
  
Thus, while it may be inaccurate to argue that corruption merely reflects 
uncontested local economic realities that represent viable alternatives to the failures of 
neoliberalism, it is similarly insufficient to claim that corruption is universally damaging, 
illogical, unpopular and disconnected from liberalization itself, or indeed that any 
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consensus exists surrounding the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the first place.
129
 
The relationship between illicit and illegitimate economic activities and neoliberalism 
complicates understandings of power and resistance. Insofar as neoliberalism is 
fundamentally tied to the activities, processes and arrangements that it externalizes—or 
others in postcolonial terms—and casts outside of the scope of legal, legitimate behaviour, 
it must be seen as engendering the very forms of resistance that counters its own power. 
Resistance to neoliberalism, at least in terms of illicit and illegitimate economic activity, is 
inherent in neoliberalism itself. The liberal peace masks internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies that make it fundamentally unstable in both conceptual and practical 
terms.
130
 The problematic way in which concepts of economic legality and legitimacy are 
constructed must be seen as a key factor in this instability, and cannot be ignored in either 
South Sudan or post-conflict environments more generally. 
 
ii. Land Tenure 
Dominant understandings of legitimacy and legality are contested not only by the 
economic activities, processes and arrangements that are delegitimized and criminalized in 
orthodox approaches, but also by resistance to those that are conversely regarded as 
legitimate and legal. Such is the case with the issue of land tenure in South Sudan, and 
particularly the role that foreign firms and investors play in the mass privatization of land. 
Between 2007 and 2010, a total of 26,400 square kilometres of land in South Sudan was 
leased or sold to foreign investors for the purpose of developing the country’s agricultural, 
forestry and biofuel sectors. An additional 31,000 square kilometres of land have been 
acquired for the purposes of tourism and conservation or obtained by domestic investors, 
bringing the total to 56,400 square kilometres—or 9% of South Sudan’s total territory—in 
28 separate deals.
131
  
It is possible to conceptualize these deals as a form of neoliberal power that is 
disconnected from the needs and interests of local communities in South Sudan. The 
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relevant local parties were only consulted in nine of the 28 deals, and as many as 11 
involved the possible or definite displacement of inhabitants or restrictions on their access 
to agricultural, pastoral or forested lands that contributed to their livelihoods.
132
 For 
instance, when Al Ain National Wildlife, an Emirati firm, acquired the rights to 16,800 
square kilometres in Boma National Park, Jonglei State for 30 years from July 2008, local 
communities were not consulted despite the fact that the project could involve the 
displacement of up to 15,000 people.
133
  
Domestic investors tend to consult with local communities more than foreign 
investors, largely because foreign firms and individuals are more frequently able to exert 
political influence that allows them to bypass such negotiations.
134
 When Concord 
Agriculture, a subsidiary of Citadel Capital, an Egyptian private equity firm, leased 1,050 
square kilometres of community-owned land in Unity State for 25 years in 2009, the 
company negotiated its lease (the terms of which are not public) directly with the 
government of Unity State. The deal was apparently facilitated by the close personal 
relationships that the founder and chairman of Citadel Capital, Ahmed Heikal, enjoyed 
with many high-ranking SPLM officials.
135
 Similarly, in 2009, Jarch Management Group, 
Ltd, an American organization registered in the Virgin Islands, leased 4,000 square 
kilometres from Leac for Agriculture and Investment Company Limited, a company 
registered in Juba that is owned by the son Paulino Matip Nhial, then serving as the deputy 
commander-in-chief of the SPLA. Jarch Management did not consult with local 
communities despite the potential displacements it project could entail.
136
  
Some deals even involved bypassing the relevant domestic authorities. When the 
GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry negotiated the sale of controlling shares in the 
Equatoria Teak Company and the Central Equatoria Teak Company, both involved in 
forestry in South Sudan, to the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), a 
developmental finance institution controlled by the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development, and the Finnish Fund for Development Cooperation 
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(Finnfund), majority owned by the government of Finland, in 2007, it did not consult either 
the state governments of Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria or the local 
communities that would be affected by such a deal. The CDC and Finnfund ultimately sold 
their interests in both companies to anonymous investors without informing the 
government.
137
 
The promised benefits of land deals often fail to materialize. Whereas domestic 
initiatives are commonly centred on community projects or involve small-scale individual 
investments, foreign ones are usually much larger and more centralized, averaging, for 
example, 1,750 square kilometres of land compared to just 96.2 square kilometres in their 
domestic counterparts. Foreign projects also commonly employ large-scale mechanized 
industrial methods that, while possibly improving productivity, minimize local 
employment and can undermine long-term sustainability.
138
 The Central Equatoria Teak 
Company never began its operations, and while the Equatoria Teak Company became 
operational, its benefits to the local population were minimal as it only created 
approximately 600 of a promised 6,000 jobs for local residents, paid the majority of its 
local workers the equivalent of about US $2 per day and, after only three years, shut down 
production. Poor working conditions and physical abuse were also reported. Equatoria 
Teak ultimately paid only US $79,000 of the US $100,000 that it owed to local 
communities, while Central Equatoria Teak did not pay any of the US $200,000 that it 
initially pledged.
139
 Projects by both Al Ain National Wildlife and Concord Agriculture 
also generated limited local employment while neglecting promised, but not legally 
binding, social initiatives.
140
 
Many land deals have encountered significant local resistance. Local residents 
responded to a March 2008 agreement in which Nile Trading and Development, Inc, an 
American firm, leased 6,000 square kilometres of land (with an option on up to 10,000 
square kilometres) from an organization called the Mukaya Payam Cooperative for 
approximately US $25,000 by protesting the deal and lobbying the GoSS for its 
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cancellation, effectively halting the project.
141
 The residents of Mukaya Payam were 
certainly undertaking a form of direct collective resistance when they protested and 
petitioned the GoSS, as were, in a different way, those who refused to be displaced as a 
part of Al Ain National Wildlife’s project in Boma National Park.142 In both instances, the 
deals that were being resisted represent the broader failures and abuses involved in the 
country’s land tenure system. The mass privatization of land in post-conflict South Sudan 
is an integral aspect of the country’s neoliberal economic reforms, which thus represent the 
ultimate structural target of local resistance.  
Other deals, meanwhile, have not encountered local resistance. Of course, even in 
cases where overt resistance is difficult to discern, it is possible that local actors are, 
following Scott, undertaking forms of everyday resistance that have not been documented. 
But the absence of sufficient evidence limits the potential for empirical claims. The fact 
that local actors may not resist unpopular socioeconomic realities suggests that it is more 
appropriate to understand power as producing the potential for, rather than the reality of, 
resistance. The disconnect between widespread dissatisfaction with the effects of power 
and the absence of resistance implies that Scott’s critique of Gramsci—that power can 
limit action while having little ability to influence thought—has a certain degree of 
validity.
143
 In other instances, as in the case of Concord Agriculture, local residents 
expressed their willingness to wait for promised benefits despite the fact that few had 
materialized. This suggests that they not only had faith that their agreement would be 
honoured, but also that, more fundamentally, the deal itself was not viewed in an entirely 
negative way. Importantly, however, they also expressed confidence in their ability to 
terminate the deal if promised benefits were not delivered.
144
 This further stresses the 
importance of understanding power as merely establishing the potential for resistance; 
whether or not this potential is translated into the reality of resistance can only be 
discerned through the analysis of individual manifestations of power. Resistance is often 
present where power can be found, but it is also often absent. Agency is necessary for the 
potential for resistance inherent in power to be realized, as resistance does not merely 
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occur because power is present, but because individual agents respond to the presence of 
power.  
Furthermore, while it is possible to understand resistance to certain land deals as 
contestations of supposedly legitimate and legal economic activity, it is also important to 
recognize the diverse roles that different international, national, community and everyday 
actors played in each. The CDC and Finnfund, both majority owned by foreign 
governments, agreed their contracts with the GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
leading to opposition from state governments and local groups before these interests were 
ultimately sold without the consent or knowledge of the GoSS.
145
 Local residents refused 
repeated relocation requests in a project led by Al Ain National Wildlife despite the 
accession of the GoSS and some community leaders.
146
 Concord Agriculture reached a 
generous agreement with Unity State, possibly facilitated by personal connections,
147
 and 
Jarch Management acquired a lease from a private company with close ties to the SPLA.
148
 
In 2010, a South Sudanese civil society group known as the Agency for Independent 
Media revealed the Mukaya Payam Cooperative to be a fictitious entity comprised of three 
relatives from Mukaya Payam who entered into the lease with Nile Trading and 
Development without the consent or prior knowledge of other members of the community. 
In fact, as Mukaya Payam is only one of five payams in Lainya County, which in total only 
covers 3,450 square kilometres, the Mukaya Payam Cooperative leased not only their own 
community’s land without any official authority or consent, but the lands of other 
communities as well. Community and everyday actors eventually gained the support of the 
GoSS against a collection of American firms and individual local actors derided as urban 
‘intellectuals’, while two civil society organizations, one domestic (the Agency for 
Independent Media) and one international (the Oakland Institute, an American 
organization), played instrumental roles in publicizing the deal and encouraging local 
opposition.
149
  
Power and resistance can thus become manifest in a variety of ways in debates 
about economic legitimacy and legality, and it is important not to attribute either power or 
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resistance exclusively to specific actors. Different international, national, community and 
everyday actors can exercise power, while others of all types can participate in resistance. 
The reality that any actor can participate in power or resistance highlights the importance 
of individual agency, as while agency must always be considered in relation to the 
influence of structural circumstances, it nevertheless allows for significant variance in 
personal perspective and action. 
Standard dichotomizations of legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit economic 
activity therefore fail to capture the diverse actors and perspectives that characterize local 
economic realities in South Sudan. To understand why these dichotomies remain largely 
unproblematized in peacebuilding and development orthodoxy, it is necessary to consider 
in whose interests they are defined and what discourses, processes and norms they reflect. 
The critique that peacebuilding entails a form of Foucauldian biopower and 
governmentality is particularly relevant, as defining certain behaviours and modes of 
organization as acceptable and desirable—and, in doing so, separating these from what are 
similarly defined as unacceptable and undesirable—without taking local context into 
account represents a form of disciplinary normalization that seeks to render foreign 
economic activities coherent with liberal processes and logics. Concepts of legitimacy and 
legality are not apolitical, value-neutral, objective or universal, but instead reflect a 
decontextualized understanding of, in this case, neoliberal economic activities, processes, 
systems and modes of organization that are laden with their own assumptions, discourses 
and histories.
150
 The dynamics of power and resistance are central for understanding how 
dominant concepts of legitimacy and legality—and the broader ideational systems and 
global economic realities they embody—can become destabilized in their local contacts, 
and must thus play a central role in any analysis of the political economy of a post-conflict 
environment.  
 
iii. Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to problematize dominant understandings of legitimacy and 
legality by exploring them in the context of the political economy of post-conflict South 
Sudan, specifically by analyzing how common legitimate/illegitimate and licit/illicit 
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dichotomies that frame economic action break down in their local contacts. In doing so, it 
has challenged the notion that criminalized and delegitimized activities represent a form of 
pathologized illiberalism, instead suggesting that these must be understood in terms of 
their contextual logics and their complex relation to the processes, systems, structures and 
effects of economic liberalization. It has also argued that understandings of economic 
legitimacy and legality are contested in South Sudan in two important ways: first, by the 
prevalence of criminalized and delegitimized activities, processes and relationships, such 
as corruption, and the rationalization of these in relation to the country’s post-conflict 
political, social and economic realities that are tied to neoliberalism; and second, by 
opposition to activities that are conversely seen as legitimate and legal within neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy. Analyzing these contestations in terms of power and resistance 
reveals the hierarchies and forms of domination that underlie unproblematized 
understandings of economic legitimacy and legality, as well as how and why these are 
destabilized, questioned and negotiated in different local contexts.  
More generally, the arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate the extent to 
which power and resistance dynamics dominate post-conflict contexts, and also how 
universal generalizations and assumptions must be replaced with contextually rooted 
individual perspectives and agencies if the complexities of post-conflict environments are 
to be fully appreciated. Insofar as an appropriate understanding of power and resistance is 
able to identify the failures and instabilities of dominant orthodoxy as well as local 
opposition and alternatives, it can have potentially emancipatory implications for 
contemporary peacebuilding and development projects that cannot be ignored. The 
disconnect between neoliberal economic orthodoxy and contextual realties, logics and 
perspectives has had, as this chapter has demonstrated, significant implications for post-
conflict South Sudan. These realities cannot be understood independently of the complex 
dynamics of power and resistance, and must therefore be taken into account if a long-term, 
broad-based and locally owned peace is to be realized.   
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Chapter V: Borderlands 
The economic activities that neoliberal orthodoxy renders informal, illicit and 
illegitimate can also be conceptualized in spatial terms. Geographic spaces that are seen as 
irregular, incomprehensible or ungovernable are othered or otherwise neglected by 
neoliberalism, contrasting the unproblematized sphere of neoliberalism with a variety of 
physical borderlands that exist at the margins of political and economic power. These 
borderlands play a central role in shaping the political economy of (post-)conflict 
environments, and should thus be a primary focus of any peacebuilding and development 
initiative. Academic and policy literature tend to minimize or mischaracterize the role that 
borderlands play in post-conflict environments, instead treating states as largely 
homogeneous entities with unifying, undifferentiated political economy landscapes that, to 
the extent that they deviate from the prescripts of neoliberalism, possess pathologies that 
are solvable through a universalized set of reforms. With respect to South Sudan, this 
literature needs to examine the impact of economic activity in borderlands on the country’s 
post-conflict transition. Resistance is a crucial variable in understanding the political 
economy of borderlands, as it provides for a useful conceptualization of the 
centre/periphery dynamics of borderlands while highlighting the hierarchies, forms of 
exclusion and contestations that characterize them. Such a conceptualization allows for an 
appropriate consideration of the extent to which the political economy of borderlands can 
contribute to—as well as hinder—peacebuilding and development, as while resistance can 
be emancipatory, it is also characterized by subjectivity, hybridity and a fundamental 
connection to power that limits its value in the establishment of peace and the promotion of 
broad-based economic growth. 
This chapter explores the centrality of South Sudan’s borderlands as sites of power 
and resistance. Borderlands are conceptualized broadly to include national, internal and 
global marginalized spaces, highlighting the multiple ways that peripheralization can be 
understood in South Sudan. Understanding the economic dimensions of borderlands in 
terms of resistance is necessary for two reasons. First, studying the economic activities, 
processes and relationships that exist in areas where state authority is limited allows for the 
underlying logics that connect a broad range of actions, actors and spaces to be identified. 
The political economy of borderlands cannot be understood independently of resistance to 
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external political and economic power. Second, focusing on resistance as a key aspect of 
the economic characteristics of borderlands emphasizes the necessity of taking subjective 
local realities into account in the implementation of peacebuilding and development 
initiatives. Borderlands are spaces of significant diversity, complexity and transformation, 
and illustrate the heterogeneity that can characterize a post-conflict situation. Engaging 
with them—and their resistance dynamics—must be central to any peacebuilding and 
development project. 
This chapter is divided into three sections, with each exploring a different 
dimension of the concept of borderlands.
151
 The first section focuses on areas that are 
marginalized in the international system, arguing that South Sudan has long existed as an 
international borderland. Current peacebuilding and development projects threaten to 
perpetuate this marginalization by (re)integrating the country into an international system 
where it lacks access to political and economic power. Informal and illicit networks exist 
that allow South Sudan, like all international borderlands, to partially counteract the effects 
of exclusion and subordination. While these informal and illicit networks have important 
power dimensions that are fundamentally connected to neoliberalism, they should also be 
seen as representative of a political economy of resistance that emerges because of the 
marginalization of international borderlands. 
The second section focuses on spaces that surround national borders, and 
demonstrates that informal transborder trade shapes the political economy of South 
Sudan’s national borderlands in fundamental ways. Efforts by the state to exert its 
authority over these spaces clash with the persistence of informal transborder trade, a 
process that is defined by the interaction of power and resistance. Informal transborder 
trade must not be entirely equated with resistance, however, as it also contains its own 
forms of power that are tied to neoliberalism. The interaction of structure and agency is 
examined as a key determinant for whether or not participation in informal transborder 
trade can be understood in terms of power or resistance, and it is argued that where agency 
is present, participation in informal transborder trade can be understood as a form of 
resistance even if it reproduces the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism. Where 
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agency is absent, informal transborder trade represents a form of power as those who 
engage in it lack viable alternatives for economic wellbeing. This duality of power and 
resistance is a key element of informal transborder trade.   
The third section examines internal spaces where the power of the state has 
minimal resonance. The political economy of South Sudan’s internal borderlands is 
explored with a particular emphasis on how their economic realities have been shaped by 
the country’s conflicts and economic transformations. Changes to the political economy of 
rural areas, such as the commoditization of cattle-raiding and human life with respect to 
land tenure claims, are framed in terms of the interaction of external economic realities 
with local power structures as a means of demonstrating the subjectivity of power and 
resistance when both can be undertaken by the same actors or present in the same 
phenomena. The interaction of local power structures and external economic realities also 
illustrates the hybridity that results from the interaction of power and resistance. The 
political economy of South Sudan’s internal borderlands thus demonstrates how power and 
resistance can be both perceptively dependent and mutually influential. 
 
i. International Borderlands  
Many international spaces are excluded by or marginalized from the global centres 
of political and economic power. This marginalization takes many forms. ‘Rogue states’ 
are commonly denoted as those that do not comply with international norms, even when 
these norms have little relevance to, or conflict with, local realities and interests. ‘Failed’ 
states are understood as those whose traditional structures of central governance are seen to 
have broken down, despite the fact that alternative social, political and economic realities 
may emerge in the absence of other authority. Other states occupy a position of self-
perpetuating underdevelopment, lacking the resources for economic growth through formal 
channels of acquisition, production and exchange. These marginalized spaces effectively 
constitute international borderlands, and are cast as irregular, undesirable and potentially 
ungovernable by the actors that dominate the international system. They are also viewed 
within the context of the security/development nexus, which profoundly shapes efforts 
external efforts of engagement and regulation.  
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South Sudan has long existed as an international borderland. Throughout the 
expansion of Ottoman Egypt in the 19
th
 century, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-
1956) and the existence of the unified Republic of Sudan (1956-2011), the region was 
marginalized in political, social and economic terms, and subjected to several ambitions 
projects to (ostensibly) facilitate governance and development. Most of these, however, 
were divorced from local realities and ultimately failed in their implementation.
152
 
Contemporary peacebuilding and development initiatives generally represent attempts to 
normalize and stabilize international borderlands while (re)incorporating them into the 
global economic and political system in a way that coheres with externally defined liberal 
logics, and their implementation in South Sudan must be historically contextualized in 
relation to past efforts to regulate the territory and render it controllable through the 
imposition of external power.
153
 The formal (re)integration current peacebuilding and 
development projects seek to accomplish threatens to limit South Sudan’s access to 
political and economic power, perpetuating its historical peripheralization. The country’s 
current peripheralization becomes manifest in several ways, most notably the lack of 
access to capital and other financial instruments, international trade regimes that favour 
those who implement them and predatory investment that results in the acquisition of the 
country’s assets by foreign firms and investors for little compensation. Each of these harms 
formal production and exchange in South Sudan and contributes to the erosion of the 
country’s economic autonomy. Each is also fundamentally linked to the neoliberal 
structures and logics that dominate the international system, demonstrating the deep impact 
that neoliberal forms of power can have on shaping the political economy of post-conflict 
South Sudan. 
While it is true that international borderlands are largely excluded from the formal 
economic structures and processes that dominate the international system, however, they 
are simultaneously (re)incorporated into the global economy through reflexive informal 
and illicit networks with international linkages. Economic liberalization plays a key role in 
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fostering this duality of marginalization and integration.
154
 The informal and illicit 
networks that emerge in international borderlands are central to the global economy, and 
commonly possess significant social and political dimensions that can challenge—or even 
form a fundamental part of—state power.155 As outlined in Chapters III and IV of this 
study, this simultaneous exclusion and (re)integration primarily takes place through the 
informal, criminalized or delegitimized economic activities that dominate the political 
economy of South Sudan. These activities—from informal production and exchange to 
corruption and, as will be discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter, informal 
transborder trade—have deep international linkages, particularly given the extent to which 
they are tied to the broader processes, logics and structures that define neoliberalism. They 
also have important power dimensions and should not be universally equated with 
resistance. Nevertheless, the networks that they involve can undermine the state while 
resisting—if being facilitated by and ultimately taking part in—the formal structures, 
processes and norms that marginalize spaces and peoples in the global economy.  
Contemporary peacebuilding and development projects that are disconnected from 
local needs and interests are thus maintaining South Sudan as an international borderland 
where informal and illicit economic activities resist, to some extent, the political and 
economic marginalization of the country by acting outside of—but in ways that are still 
fundamentally connected to—neoliberal forms of power. The simultaneous exclusion and 
(re)integration that this involves is a definitive aspect of the centre/periphery dynamics of 
borderlands, as efforts to impose centralized authority in peripheralized spaces conflicts 
with local economic realities. These local economic realities have important power 
dimensions, but they still constitute resistance to the political and economic power that 
dominates the international system. 
 
ii. National Borderlands 
The second relevant way that borderlands can be conceptualized is in terms of the 
spaces surrounding national borders that are subject to both the imposition of state 
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authority and regional dynamics that can undermine the efforts of central governance. 
National borderlands have emerged as an important focus of study within a variety of 
academic disciplines.
156
 Much of this literature stresses how borders are historically 
constructed phenomena that are neither static nor apolitical. Power plays an important role 
in the formation of borders, as the emergence of states and their efforts to define and 
incorporate territory within governable limits involves the peripheralization and 
normalization of areas that are beyond a centralized core. The creation of artificial borders 
and the incorporation of surrounding regions within a centralized state, however, can be 
fundamentally incomplete as borderlands are able to maintain their ties with adjacent 
territories and continue to be shaped by cross-border dynamics. The interaction between 
the centralizing efforts of the state and transborder ties define borderlands as spaces of 
transformation, hybridity and contestation, where various political, social and economic 
realities, along with forms of identity, overlap, interact and become redefined.
157
  
South Sudan possesses a number of distinct national borderlands, each of which has 
been shaped by its own particular geography and political, economic and socio-cultural 
history. Territories bordering Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and the Central African Republic all possess significant transborder ties and are 
marked by livelihoods that are often more interconnected with—and similar to—regions 
outside of the country than others within it.
158
 While information on how South Sudan’s 
national borderlands have evolved is somewhat minimal due to the limitations of the 
historical record, it is evident that they have played, and continue play, a central role in 
shaping conflict in the country and influencing its post-independence statebuilding 
process.
159
  
This centre/periphery tension has important economic dimensions. The very 
existence of borders encourages transborder trade, both formal and informal, through the 
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creation and reification of economic difference. Customs duties, systems of taxation, 
export arrangements, prices, market access, legal frameworks and levels of development 
can vary significantly across international borders, greatly affecting the economic 
calculations involved in the production and distribution of goods.
160
 Informal transborder 
trade plays a major role in the political economy of South Sudan. The country’s 
independence and the definition of its borders has had a significant impact on its national 
borderlands by separating formerly fluid and interdependent communities—particularly 
along the newly established South Sudan-Sudan border—altering ownership claims to land 
and natural resources, placing barriers on migration and influencing the development of 
areas surrounding borders that gain new economic significance.
161
  
The GoSS’s attempts to assert its authority in its national borderlands has caused it 
to confront informal transborder trade through increased regulation and efforts to 
monopolize economic activity, particularly in the area surrounding the South Sudan-
Uganda border where the dominance of the South Sudanese state and military acts as an 
impediment to small-scale Ugandan traders.
162
 This represents a major disconnect between 
the centralizing efforts of the state and the political economy of its borderlands. Since the 
signing of the CPA, South Sudan has emerged as the primary destination for exports from 
Uganda. Much of this trade—perhaps the majority in certain years—passes through 
informal channels, which overlap with their formal counterparts both in terms of the people 
and methods employed as well as the goods involved. This informal transborder trade 
contributes to the livelihoods to those who might otherwise have limited opportunity to sell 
or purchase goods, thus fundamentally tying them to the economic dynamics of the 
borderlands they inhabit.
163
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Informal transborder trade is not universally benign, however, and commonly 
entails important internal hierarchies, particularly as certain groups or individuals can 
come to control access and monopolize profits. Ugandan traders are often seen to dominate 
informal transborder trade in South Sudan, provoking xenophobia and a widespread sense 
of injustice.
164
 Nor is this trade always centred on the exchange of licit goods. Practices 
such as illegal arms trafficking also play a role in informal transborder trade, and can 
contribute to the perpetuation of regional conflicts. As the respective governments of South 
Sudan and the Republic of Sudan are accused of seeking to undermine each other through 
the clandestine support of rebel movements, the illegal trade of arms—and the distinct 
possibility that state or quasi-state actors play a major role in this trade—represents a major 
threat to regional stability.
165
 The area surrounding the South Sudan-Sudan border is a key 
borderland in which both states seek to impose their authority. Informal transborder trade 
takes places along the newly established and somewhat arbitrary border between the two 
states, but the form of power that it interacts with is much more militarized than elsewhere 
as ongoing ‘internal’ conflicts in the region demonstrate.166 
Informal transborder trade is often seen to play an ambiguous role in peacebuilding 
and development, with academic and policy literature oscillating between viewing it as a 
problem to be solved through liberal reforms and as representative of popular resistance to 
the failures of the state and the market.
167
 Costly and inefficient channels for formal trade, 
poor border infrastructure, the lack of access to finance, low market information, 
corruption and insecurity at formal border crossings and limited levels of education and 
business training are all seen as primary contributing factors to informal transborder trade, 
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which is commonly understood as a form of local neoliberalism that is engaged in by 
rational actors as a response to illiberal trading systems.
168
 These problems are viewed as 
solvable through further economic liberalization both in South Sudan and elsewhere, as is 
the existence of informal transborder trade itself.
169
 Such an approach, however, is 
problematic, as liberalization has historically contributed to the expansion of informal 
transborder trade by facilitating access to global networks of production and exchange.
170
 
Economic liberalization is therefore fundamentally tied to informal transborder trade, and 
should not be viewed as a means of eradicating it. 
At the same time, informal transborder trade is both incorporated into and 
disavowed by neoliberalism. On the one hand, it is seen as a local form of neoliberalism 
that emerges in response to illiberal economic realities; on the other, it is viewed as an 
undesirable effect of these realities that can be eradicated through liberalizing economic 
reforms. The partial othering of informal transborder trade is a sign of the extent to which 
it is conceptually tied to conflict and criminality, suggesting that it is seen to present a 
threat to security/development nexus that dominates South Sudan and other post-conflict 
environments.
171
 This duality of incorporation and disavowal has important implications 
for understanding informal transborder trade in terms of power and resistance. Specifically, 
a notable tension exists between understanding neoliberalism as a form of international 
power and as the underlying logic of the methods adopted to resist that power. 
Neoliberalism defines the international system in which South Sudan is politically and 
economically marginalized as well as the economic orthodoxy adhered to by the 
international actors involved in South Sudan’s peacebuilding and development projects. It 
can also be seen to define informal transborder trade where voluntary participation in such 
activity establishes or perpetuates socioeconomic hierarchies and inequalities. Informal 
transborder trade can therefore replicate the power dynamics inherent in neoliberalism, 
thereby complicating the extent to which it can be understood as a form of local resistance.  
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It is possible to view informal transborder trade as a form of indirect individual or 
collective resistance to what is perceived as a form of unjust or exclusionary political and 
economic power. Everyday actors dominate this form of resistance, but a variety of 
international, national and community actors can be involved in it as well. When the power 
dynamics of neoliberalism are not replicated, the engagement in informal transborder trade 
in a way that reflects popular interests represents, in Polanyian terms, an attempt to restore 
the social embeddedness of a market that no longer functions in a way that benefits local 
communities. When the power dynamics of neoliberalism are replicated, conversely, 
informal transborder trade is not related to larger social goals or conducive to broad-based 
emancipation. Because it contests existing socioeconomic realities, however, it still 
represents a form of resistance for those who engage in it voluntarily, even if it serves as a 
form of power for others. 
The central variable for understanding informal transborder trade in terms of power 
or resistance surrounds the interaction of structure and agency. Informal transborder trade 
involves both voluntary and non-voluntary participation, as while some may engage in 
informality in a conscious effort to circumvent the inefficiencies of the state or overcome 
unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, others can be forced into informality as a result of 
necessity when no other options are available. Resistance requires agency; where agency is 
absent, resistance cannot be said to exist. Similarly, limiting agency is a key component of 
power. Those who are forced into informality can therefore not be seen as engaging in 
resistance. Where agency is present, however, participation in informal transborder trade 
represents a form of resistance regardless of intent as resistance is an inherent quality of 
voluntary participation itself. Such resistance can be connected with power, making the 
dual nature of informal transborder trade a defining feature of South Sudan’s national 
borderlands.  
 
iii. Internal Borderlands 
Finally, states also possess internal borderlands in areas where central authority has 
limited resonance. The physical geography of a space can affect its governability, as can 
local lifestyle patterns, cultures and histories. Alternative power structures that circumvent 
or actively resist centralization can exist in rural communities or develop in urban 
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environments.
172
 Internal borderlands exist in a number of forms: where ethnic identities 
mix, where colonial boundaries meet, where development has established economic 
difference and where private non-state actors exercise political authority.
173
 The 
boundaries that exist within states can have the same economic effects as national borders, 
and thus become entrenched as those who benefit from their existence may resist attempts 
to eliminate them through the imposition of state power.
174
 
South Sudan also possesses a number of internal borderlands where state authority 
has limited resonance. Both the First and Second Sudanese Civil War involved significant 
internal divisions with complex and shifting objectives, logics, loyalties, animosities and 
patterns of violence, complicating overly simplistic narratives that frame each in terms of a 
popular struggle for independence against an oppressive regime that was universally 
viewed as illegitimate. Many of the dichotomies that are commonly employed to frame the 
conflicts—including North/South, black/Arab and Christian/Muslim—are thus 
inappropriate as they reduce both to the contestation of two monolithic and diametrically 
opposed groups, failing to account for the multiple and fluid identities that characterized 
divisions and the heterogeneity of participants. Despite independence, therefore, South 
Sudan must not be viewed as a homogeneous or internally coherent entity; the state itself 
lacks universal legitimacy and hegemony within its own territorial limits, and has been 
forced to contend with the continuation of violence, much of which has significant regional 
and ethnic dimensions, since the official end of the most recent civil war in 2005.
175
  
Even where the authority of the state is not undermined by violence, the 
government must contend with local power structures.
176
 The domination of the state by 
the SPLM/A is another major hindrance to the state’s internal hegemony since, as the 
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SPLM/A is a former guerrilla force that came to power in a deeply divisive civil war and is 
particularly associated with the Dinka, one of the country’s major ethnic groups, it does not 
enjoy universal support or legitimacy.
177
 Accusations of widespread abuses of power and 
the perpetration of violence further limit the government’s popularity,178 while rising crime 
rates in urban areas have raised concerns about the state’s ability to maintain its monopoly 
on violence.
179
 The South Sudanese state must therefore be conceptualized not as a unified 
territorial entity in which the government exercises complete authority, but rather as a 
space where state control is confined to strategic centres of power and interspersed with 
areas where this power has little or no resonance. South Sudan’s internal conflicts can be 
understood in terms of the government’s attempts to impose state authority beyond existing 
centres of power and the resistance that this engenders. 
South Sudan’s internal borderlands have important economic dimensions. During 
the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLM/A sometimes interfered with local trade 
patterns or violently took them over, leading to local resistance in the form of efforts to 
evade monopolization and widespread violent confrontation. The conflict also involved the 
commoditization and monetization of rural livelihoods, which had a significant impact on 
‘traditional’ practices such as cattle-raiding by creating incentives for profit and 
establishing linkages to broader trade networks.
180
 Land tenure claims have been similarly 
transformed, with the emergence of assertions of ownership based on wartime experiences 
reflecting the commoditization of human life.
181
 These changes are widely seen to reflect 
the encroachment of an urban monetary economy that is associated with the corrupt 
practices of the government and the army. The perceived failures and abuses of the 
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monetary economy have reified local power structures, while also forcing those who 
participate in it to adapt to established social relations.
182
  
South Sudan’s internal borderlands therefore possess unique economic 
characteristics that have been shaped by centre/periphery interactions as external forces 
influence and are contested by local economic realities. Power and resistance structure 
these interactions, with local power structures representing a sphere in which direct 
collective resistance can take place. The targets of resistance here are the external 
influences associated with the state and the urban monetary economy that are transforming 
local economic realities. Insofar as these local structures reflect popular interests, their 
maintenance serves as a Polanyian double movement that seeks to prevent the 
disentangling of society and the economy, and also a form of Gramscian counter-
hegemony that contests existing systems of power while a providing viable social, political 
and economic alternatives. Beyond such a simplistic equation of ‘the local’ with resistance, 
however, it is also important to recognize that what constitutes power for some can serve 
as a form of resistance for others. While local power structures seek to resist the imposition 
of external political economies as a means of maintaining a social and political status quo, 
they also act as a form of power themselves. For those who are dissatisfied with the status 
quo, embracing these external political economies—such as the commoditization of cattle-
raiding or alternative land tenure claims—may serve as an effective form of resistance.183 
Power and resistance are thus not mutually exclusive, and indeed may be practiced by the 
same actors or present in the same phenomena. In these instances, what constitutes power 
and resistance is purely based on perspective.  
The fact that local socioeconomic realities are both influenced by and able to 
influence external political economies demonstrates the extent to which the 
centre/periphery dynamics of South Sudan’s internal borderlands are characterized by 
hybridity. Power and resistance are neither static nor monolithic; the interaction between 
the two is one of constant redefinition, reaction and transformation. This relationship 
defines the dynamism and persistence of the country’s borderlands, and demonstrates the 
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inherent limitations of peacebuilding and development initiatives that are narrowly focused 
on the expansion of centralized authority. 
 
iv. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that resistance plays a significant role in the political 
economy of South Sudan’s borderlands. In doing so, it has conceptualized the country’s 
borderlands in three distinct ways. First, South Sudan has historically existed as an 
international borderland at the margins of political and economic power. Current 
peacebuilding and development initiatives threaten to perpetuate this marginalization by 
(re)integrating the country into an international system in which its access to power 
remains minimal. Informal and illicit networks are able to counter this official exclusion by 
(re)linking the country to the global economy in a way that is fundamentally connected to 
neoliberal logics and processes. Second, South Sudan possesses national borderlands 
where the authority of the state contests with regional dynamics that transcend national 
boundaries. Informal transborder trade is a key feature of the political economy of South 
Sudan’s national borderlands, and while it can possess its own power dimensions that are 
tied to neoliberalism, engagement in informal transborder trade still constitutes a form of 
resistance to the economic and political power of the state. Finally, the country contains a 
variety of internal borderlands where the state has little resonance. The political economy 
of these spaces has been profoundly shaped by conflict and constantly transformed by 
interactions with external economic realities. Subjectivity and hybridity define these 
interactions and are thus key features of the political economy of the country’s internal 
borderlands.  
All three forms of borderlands addressed in this chapter are defined by 
centre/periphery tensions that must be understood in terms of power and resistance, where 
attempts to normalize and incorporate externalized spaces are met with entrenched social, 
political and economic forces. It is essential that South Sudan’s peacebuilding and 
development projects take the power and resistance dynamics that define the country’s 
borderlands into account. Local realities, needs and interests must be engaged with in 
South Sudan’s borderlands, and the hierarchies, inequalities and injustices that shape these 
spaces must be addressed in a way that emphasizes local ownership, popular support and 
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emancipation. Insofar as the resistant dynamics of the country’s borderlands contribute to 
such an objective, they should play a central role in peacebuilding and development. 
Informal transborder trade and traditional social, political and economic structures are 
especially relevant here, but given the extent to which each involves its own forms of 
power, neither should be viewed as entirely conducive to peace or equitable development. 
Their resistance dynamics, however, provide a valuable alternative to the hierarchies and 
forms of exclusion and exploitation that characterize neoliberal power. These dynamics 
may not cohere with existing orthodoxy, but they are nevertheless a defining feature of 
South Sudan’s political economy and must play a central role in the country’s post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusions and Potential Avenues for Future Research  
This study has addressed the under-conceptualization of resistance in contemporary 
peacebuilding and development projects by exploring how post-conflict economic 
orthodoxy is contested in South Sudan. A framework of resistance emphasizing a diversity 
of actors, methods and targets, the interaction of structure and agency and the difficulties 
surrounding the issue of intent has been proposed and subsequently applied to economic 
activities that are cast as informal, illicit and illegitimate by the neoliberal economic logic 
that dominates the country’s post-conflict environment. This framework has provided a 
number of valuable insights into such economic activities, demonstrating the necessity of 
understanding the resistance as a central feature of the political economy of South Sudan. 
Informal economic activity possesses a certain degree of ambivalence within the 
neoliberal logic that informs South Sudan’s post-conflict economic orthodoxy. While 
neoliberal approaches often view the informal sector as a form of local neoliberalism that 
exists as a result of the costs and inefficiencies involved in formality, they also present the 
informal sector as a problem to be solved through further economic liberalization. This 
simultaneous incorporation and disavowal of informality by neoliberalism demonstrates a 
denial of the extent to which neoliberalism is tied to power and possesses its own forms of 
domination, exploitation and exclusion. While informal economic activity serves for some 
as a means of resisting the failures of the formal sector, it exists for others as a sphere of 
power in which the hierarchies and forms of exclusion that define neoliberalism are 
replicated and unregulated. The presence of agency is essential for understanding 
participation in the informal sector as resistance. Where agency is absent, so is resistance. 
Where agency can be identified, however, resistance can be said to be present as well, 
regardless of whether or not this resistance is tied to the very form of neoliberal power that 
produces it. 
Other economic activities occupy a less ambivalent role in neoliberal orthodoxy, 
and are instead criminalized or delegitimized altogether. The dichotomization of licit/illicit 
and legitimate/illegitimate economic activity, however, has limited local resonance in 
South Sudan. Debates surrounding corruption and land tenure in South Sudan demonstrate 
the extent to which orthodox understandings of legitimacy and legality are commonly 
resisted. Corruption, which is seen as illegal and illegitimate in neoliberal orthodoxy, is 
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fundamentally tied to both poverty and neoliberalism itself, and therefore cannot be 
understood as the antithesis of neoliberalism or as enjoying local legitimacy. Neoliberal 
understandings of legality and legitimacy are also contested by a variety of actors in South 
Sudan, as demonstrated by the widespread resistance that the acquisition of land by foreign 
firms and investors inspired in the country. Understandings of legitimacy and legality are 
neither neutral nor apolitical, and their definition is a key quality of economic and political 
power. They are also not static or uncontested, and the ways in which they are resisted and 
redefined is a dominant feature of the political economy of South Sudan.  
Power and resistance also define South Sudan’s borderlands. Informal and illicit 
networks are able to partially (re)integrate South Sudan into the international system at the 
same time that the country is excluded from formal access to political and economic 
power. Informal transborder trade ties South Sudan’s national borderlands to adjacent 
territories in a way that undermines the centralizing efforts of the state. Finally, the 
authority of the South Sudanese state competes with local social, political and economic 
realities in internal spaces where state power is limited. The centre/periphery dynamics that 
shape each aspect of the country’s borderlands are defined by the interaction of power and 
resistance in a way that is both subjective and hybrid. Resistance has a transformative 
effect on the political economy of South Sudan’s borderlands, even if it cannot be 
universally defined. 
These arguments can be generalized into a number of key findings, which are 
highlighted in the next section of this chapter. The final section outlines several avenues 
for potentially valuable future research that follow from this study. 
 
i. Key Findings 
This study has a number of key findings. The framework of resistance it has 
employed emphasizes themes that are commonly neglected in the standard theory and 
praxis of peacebuilding and development. Resistance must be conceptualized broadly to 
incorporate a diverse set of actors, methods and targets so as to capture the phenomenon its 
full breadth, depth and complexity. The actors, methods and targets involved in resistance 
are extremely variable. International, national, community and everyday actors can all 
participate in resistance, but as all can also participate in power, analyses that equate 
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resistance with ‘the local’ and power with ‘the international’ must be rejected as too 
simplistic. The methods of resistance are similarly diverse, and can be categorized based 
on their directness and whether they are undertaken individually or collectively. Beyond 
traditional understandings of resistance as a form of overt violence or concerted action, 
resistance can also be ideational or discursive, as described by both Gramsci and Foucault, 
or, following Scott, focused on everyday activities that contest the hegemony of power 
over individual life. No action is inherently resistant, but rather becomes a method of 
resistance based on the agency of the actors involved. Power thus produces the potential 
for, rather than the reality of, resistance, and possesses co-optive abilities that, following 
Gramsci and Foucault, can influence compliance. The production of this potential is a key 
feature of power, and this potential can only become realized by the agency of those who 
seek to target power in any of its manifestations. These manifestations can take on many 
forms, and intent is often difficult to discern, but resistance emerges in response to 
definable, circumstantially dependent applications of power. Those who engage in 
resistance may have little in common, and may indeed engage in very different actions for 
very different purposes, but they are nevertheless united by their conscious contestation of 
power. 
Another central finding is that resistance is fundamentally tied to power. Both 
power and resistance can be mutually present in the same phenomena when what 
constitutes power for some actors can constitute resistance for others. Resistance is 
therefore largely a matter of perspective and can often not be understood in universal 
terms. Furthermore, the interaction of power and resistance frequently results in the 
hybridization of the two where both become redefined and, at times, difficult to distinguish 
from each other. These ties to power mean that that resistance is not necessarily 
emancipatory; indeed, in many cases, a form of resistance by some actors may inhibit 
emancipation for others. Power and resistance are therefore neither static nor discreet 
entities; each is informed and shaped by the other and the two may be conceptually 
inseparable beyond subjective positionality. When resistance contests power, it may take 
on many of the attributes of power itself. Recognizing when this occurs requires careful 
analysis of specific interactions of power and resistance, as has been undertaken in this 
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study. Such a task is often difficult, but must nevertheless be undertaken as a part of any 
peacebuilding and development initiative. 
This study has also provided important insights on post-conflict South Sudan. The 
neoliberal orthodoxy that dominates the country’s current peacebuilding and development 
projects is disconnected from its economic realities and the needs and interests of a large 
portion of its population. Activities that are cast as informal, illicit or illegitimate by 
neoliberalism play a major role in the political economy of the country, and insofar as 
these are externalized, misunderstood or ignored, the country’s prospects for long-term 
peace and inclusive economic development will remain limited. South Sudan’s complex 
economic realities can serve as an asset rather than a liability for its future, but this would 
require significant changes to the country’s current direction. South Sudan must be able to 
forge a post-conflict political economy that is broad-based and locally owned, and one that 
minimizes hierarchical and exclusionary power arrangements. The outcome of such a 
process may not cohere with certain external expectations, but will likely improve the 
country’s prospects for development and stability.  
More broadly, the introduction of neoliberal reforms in post-conflict environments 
must be seen as both conceptually and practically problematic. The securitization of 
development and the marketization of peace, both of which have become defining features 
of post-conflict economic intervention, possess the potential to undermine the 
establishment of long-term peace by failing to address the root causes of conflict or local 
needs, interests, perspectives and subjective political economy realities. The extent to 
which neoliberal logics and processes dominate post-conflict economic orthodoxy 
emphasizes the importance of continuing to problematize the underlying assumptions of 
neoliberalism while analyzing its local contacts. Studying resistance, both in general 
theoretical terms and in its specific manifestations, provides the opportunity to explore 
alternatives to the failures of neoliberal post-conflict economic orthodoxy that are locally 
relevant. The value of this task, both for South Sudan and for post-conflict environments 
more generally, must not be underestimated. 
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ii. Future Research 
The findings of this project provide several avenues for valuable future research. 
Most fundamentally, conceptualizing resistance in post-conflict environments would 
greatly benefit from further case study work. Whether the arguments presented in this 
study are merely applicable to South Sudan or more generalizable is an important question, 
and one that can only be addressed through the rigorous scholarly analysis of other post-
conflict contexts. The framework of resistance employed in this study builds upon several 
theoretically and empirically diverse bodies of literature, particularly the study of 
resistance and critical analyses of peacebuilding, neoliberalism, African history and 
postcolonialism. The flexibility of this framework, or indeed any similar theoretical 
approach to resistance, should be explored through its repeated application to a diverse set 
of contexts. Subjectivity is a defining aspect of resistance. Case study analysis therefore 
must be a central component of any future research agenda. 
Informal, criminalized and delegitimized economic activities also deserve further 
scholarly attention. Existing studies commonly lack detailed primary accounts of the nature 
of these systems of production, accumulation and exchange, emphasizing the potential for 
future qualitative analysis to provide necessary insight into their emergence, survival, 
transformations, structures and organizations, their local, regional and transnational 
linkages, and their social, cultural and political implications. Quantitative studies would be 
valuable as well insofar as key economic data could further the understanding of the scale 
of informal, illicit and illegitimate activities as well as the trends that define them. 
Research that particularly focuses on post-conflict environments and the ramifications that 
these activities have for peacebuilding and development would be especially relevant. This 
relates to the more general objective of continuing to problematize and uncover viable 
alternatives to neoliberalism, which, despite the volume of existing critical literature, 
continues to dominate economic orthodoxy in post-conflict environments and beyond. As 
this study has argued, these alternatives may be fundamentally tied to existing forms of 
resistance, again emphasizing the necessity of studying resistance wherever and however it 
becomes manifest. 
Similarly, more empirical work on South Sudan needs to be undertaken. The 
existing literature surrounding the country’s post-conflict peacebuilding and development 
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initiatives is, at the time of writing, largely limited to official policy documents or other 
non-academic studies. While this notable absence of scholarly literature enhances the value 
of this project, it presents a major obstacle for critical analysis to develop or have any 
impact on the country’s future. Studying the political economy of the country while 
problematizing dominant approaches and uncovering broad-based, locally owned, 
contextually relevant and emancipatory alternatives to these must continue if the problems 
outlined in this study are to be addressed. The success of peacebuilding and development 
in South Sudan is by no means guaranteed. Relevant scholarly research possesses the 
potential to contribute to the country’s growth and stability, but can only do so if the right 
questions are asked. 
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